Insurer Properly Sanctioned for Failure to Obey Court Order It is Never Proper to Fail to Comply With Court Order Post 4937 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/insurer-properly-sanctioned-failure-obey-court-order-barry-vefvc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. Insurer Privilege Underwriters took its name too far trying to obtain privileges from the Arkansas Court of Appeals to which it was not entitled and acted contumaciously by disobeying the Circuit Court’s discovery order. In Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Brandon Adams, No. CV-23-474, 2024 Ark.App. 571, Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division I (November 20, 2024) the circuit court granted appellee Brandon Adams’s motion to enforce court order and motion for sanctions, imposed a “sanction fee in the amount of $5,000” against appellant Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange (“Privilege”), and awarded Adams $2,500 in attorneys’ fees and costs under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 37; denied Privilege’s motion for summary judgment; and denied Privilege’s motion for protective order, which sought to bar Adams from taking any depositions. FACTS In an insurance-coverage action in which Adams sued Privilege, his insurer, for failing to provide him a defense in a lawsuit filed against Adams and several other individuals and entities. Privilege answered Adams’s coverage complaint denying that it owed Adams a duty to defend the lawsuit and asserting a number of the subject policies’ exclusions as affirmative defenses to coverage. Adams served written discovery on Privilege. Privilege responded with objections and inadequate responses to Adams’s discovery requests. Adams moved to compel Privilege to respond and produce documents and the Court of Appeals ordered Privilege respond and to pay Adams’s attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $2,000. Privilege produced its supplemental interrogatory answers and supplemental privilege log on March 2, 2022 but did not comply with the circuit court’s discovery order. Contrary to the court’s order Privilege refused to amend its privilege log, provide full and complete answers to Adams’s interrogatories, or produce any witnesses for deposition, and instead, Privilege moved for summary judgment. Adams then filed his “Motion to Enforce Court Order and Motion for Sanctions and Incorporated Brief” on April 25, 2022. On December 20, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on Adams’s motion for sanctions and Privilege’s motions for summary judgment and for protective order. The circuit court announced that it would sanction Privilege for its failure to comply with the circuit court’s February 2022 discovery order. From the bench, the circuit court made specific findings that Privilege had failed to comply with the provisions of that order requiring Privilege to amend its privilege log to provide sufficient information to allow the circuit court and Adams to evaluate Privilege’s claims of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection and to fully answer Adams’s interrogatories. TO ESTABLISH CONTEMPT Generally, in order to establish contempt, there must be willful disobedience of a valid order of a court. Contempt is a matter between the court and the litigant, and not between the two opposing litigants. Before one can be held in contempt for violating the court’s order, the order must be definite in its terms, clear as to what duties it imposes, and express in its commands. Contempt is divided into criminal contempt and civil contempt. The standard of review on appeal depends on whether the contempt sanction was civil or criminal in nature. The circuit court imposed a fine and fees that were to be paid to Adams. A contempt fine for willful disobedience that is payable to the complainant is remedial and therefore constitutes a fine for civil contempt. Privilege refused to comply with a valid discovery order from the circuit court because Privilege disputed Adams’s entitlement to the discovery underlying that order. Instead, Privilege moved for summary judgment, attempting to render moot that prior discovery order. The circuit court rightly held Privilege in contempt for its willful disobedience of the circuit court’s February 2022 discovery order and imposed a fine of $5,000. Once the February 2022 discovery order was entered, Privilege was required to comply with that order, not question the propriety of that order or when Privilege should comply with it. The circuit court was unequivocal in finding at the December 2022 hearing that it was sanctioning Privilege for its violation of the February 2022 discovery order. The circuit court then went on to explain that Privilege had disobeyed its February 2022 order by failing to provide contact information for the witnesses identified in response to Interrogatory No. 1 and by failing to provide a privilege log with sufficient information to allow the circuit court and Adams to evaluate the claim of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court did not clearly err in holding Privilege in contempt. The circuit court had ample authority to use its contempt powers to enforce its February 2022 discovery order. ZALMA OPINION This order must be more than embarrassing to Privilege and to the insurance industry. Parties to litigation are not entitled to refuse to fulfill an order of the court. Regardless of the name of the insurer it had no special privileges and must fulfill the order to the letter and pay the sanctions including the extra sanctions placed by the Court of Appeals. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Requiring an Insurer to Waive its Right to Subrogation is a Valid & Enforceable Contract Waiver of Subrogation Applies in Marine Insurance Policy Post 4938 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/requiring-insurer-waive-its-right-subrogation-valid-zalma-esq-cfe-gkn3c/, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog. Competing motions for summary judgment were presented to the USDC for the Eastern District of Louisiana in a limitation-of-liability action arising from the listing and capsizing of the liftboat RAM XVIII. The motions present the principal question whether Fieldwood (charterer of the liftboat) must defend and indemnify Aries (owner of the liftboat) and U.S. Specialty (Aries’s insurer) under a master time charter agreement from the personal-injury claims brought by employees of Fluid Crane & Construction, Inc. and United Fire and Safety, LLC (Fieldwood’s subcontractors) who were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized. Fieldwood moved for partial summary judgment enforcing waivers of subrogation in the master time charter agreement and the relevant U.S. Specialty insurance policy. In The Matter Of Aries Marine Corporation, et al., Civil Action Nos. 19-10850, 19-13138, United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana (November 20, 2024) the USDC resolved the disputes. BACKGROUND The USDC resolved a five-year-old limitation-of-liability action that arose from the listing and capsizing of the liftboat RAM XVIII in the Gulf of Mexico. Aries chartered the RAM XVIII to Fieldwood under a master time charter agreement (the “Time Charter”) in relation to work being performed on one of Fieldwood’s offshore platforms. Under those Master Services Contracts, Fluid Crane and United Fire sent employees to work on Fieldwood’s platform; those employees were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized. U.S. Specialty, for its part, underwrote an insurance policy (the “Policy”) that provided Aries with certain coverages in effect when the RAM XVIII capsized. Six employees of Fluid Crane and one employee of United Fire-all of whom were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized-brought personal injury claims against Aries. The motions before the Court present the principal question whether Fieldwood must defend and indemnify Aries and U.S. Specialty from those personal-injury claims. THE TIME CHARTER Section 10 features a waiver-of-subrogation provision mandating that “[u]nderwriters of all policies of insurance required [by Section 10] shall waive their rights of subrogation against the Charterer Group,” which includes Fieldwood. THE POLICY The Policy provides coverage to Aries for protection and indemnity, including coverage for personal-injury liability. The Policy includes a waiver-of-subrogation provision that applies to the protection-and-indemnity coverage. A separate section of the Policy-governing hull-insurance coverage contains a waiver-of-subrogation provision and a provision naming Fieldwood as an additional insured. THE MASTER SERVICES CONTRACTS. Fieldwood executed the Master Services Contracts with Fluid Crane and United Fire, respectively. Fluid Crane and United Fire agreed to indemnify the other entities involved from claims asserted by their own employees, as well as to be responsible for defense costs for such claims. ANALYSIS Fieldwood’s Motion Fieldwood moved the Court to grant partial summary judgment enforcing waivers of subrogation in the Time Charter and Policy and dismissing Aries’s crossclaim and U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention. The Court held that Fieldwood is entitled to partial summary judgment because a review of the Time Charter and the Policy confirms that both Aries and U.S. Specialty have waived their rights of subrogation against Fieldwood. U.S. Specialty Waived Its Rights of Subrogation The Policy unambiguously waives U.S. Specialty’s right of subrogation in favor of Fieldwood. The Policy features a waiver-of-subrogation provision. The Time Charter qualifies as a “written contract” that “require[s]” U.S. Specialty to waive its rights of subrogation against Fieldwood because the Time Charter features a waiver-of-subrogation provision mandating that “[u]nderwriters of all policies of insurance required [by Section 10 of the Time Charter] shall waive their rights of subrogation against the Charterer Group,” which is defined to include Fieldwood. Because a review of the Time Charter and the Policy confirms that U.S. Specialty unambiguously waived its rights of subrogation against Fieldwood, and because the claims asserted in U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention rest on a subrogation theory, the Court granted Fieldwood’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention. The USDC concluded that the waivers of subrogation in Fieldwood’s favor are enforceable, and Aries and U.S. Specialty have not adequately presented any argument that would allow the Court to hold that their claims for defense and indemnity can survive despite the enforceability of those waivers of subrogation. Fieldwood’s motion for partial summary judgment was GRANTED. ZALMA OPINION Insurance policies like the marine policy interpreted in this case contain standard language authorizing the insured to waive the insurers’ right of subrogation if it does so before there is a loss. Since the litigants sought subrogation recovery which it had waived by the standard language of its policy this five year long litigation was resolved by the acceptance of the waiver. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Appear for a Scheduled EUO or Lose Failure to Honor Conditions Precedent Voids Coverage in New York Post 4937 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/appear-scheduled-euo-lose-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-gvkec/, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. State Farm contended that it is entitled to summary judgment because of the failure to appear for examination under oath (EUO) by multiple defendants. State Farm contended that timely notices were properly mailed to the Claimants who failed to appear. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Alford A. Smith, M.D., et al, 2024 NY Slip Op 33802(U), Index No. 155607/2020, Motion Seq. No. 003, Supreme Court, New York County, Appellate Division (October 24, 2024) court ruled in favor of State Farm. The Supreme Court of New York County ORDERED that the plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm/Plaintiff’), motion for summary judgment was GRANTED against defendants, Alford A. Smith, M.D., P.C., and the multiple other defendants who are doctors, chiropractors and other health services, (hereinafter collectively (“The Defendants”). FACTS The Supreme Court found that the EUO scheduling letters were timely requested and claimants failed to appear at that EUO. The documentary evidence showed that plaintiff sent the EUO scheduling letters to the claimants within 15 business days of receiving the prescribed verification forms as required by New York statute. FRAUD, FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR EUO & FAILURE TO SIGN TRANSCRIPT ARE BREACHES OF MATERIAL CONDITION PRECEDENT The Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court’s ruling that the failure to appear for an EUO that was requested in a timely fashion by the insurer is a breach of a condition precedent to coverage and voids the policy ab initio. In addition, although claimant Griselda Torres unlike the other defendants, appeared for her EUO, Torres failed to return a subscribed copy of her EUO transcript. State Farm properly and effectively argued that appearing for and testifying at EUO and returning the transcripts of the EUO are conditions precedent to coverage and failure to sign and return the transcript warranted a denial of the claims. State Farm demonstrated in its motion and supporting evidence that multiple claimants breached a condition precedent to coverage by failing to appear for properly noticed EUOs on two separate occasions. Furthermore, claimant Griselda Torres’ failure to subscribe and return the transcript of her EUOsviolated a condition precedent to coverage and warranted denial of the claims. Moreover, there was nothing on the Court’s record to suggest that the scheduled EUOs were not justified, nor held at a place and time that was not reasonably convenient to the defendants. CONCLUSION State Farm’s motion seeking summary judgment in its favor was GRANTED as to THE multiple defendants and it was further ORDERED that any requested relief sought not expressly addressed herein has nonetheless been considered; and it was further ORDERED that the case shall continue against the remaining defendants; and it was further ORDERED that within 30 days of entry, plaintiff shall serve a copy of this decision/order upon the defendants with notice of entry. ZALMA OPINION The defendants in this case were doctors, physicians, chiropractors and other health care providers who billed State Farm for services provided to people who were injured in automobile accidents and assigned their rights to the providers who tried to collect their billings without complying with the EUO condition. They all lost their claims because they refused to appear except one defendant who appeared but failed to sign the transcript of the EUO and return it to State Farm. They all lost their claims and State Farm will continue its actions against many more defendants not subject to the motion. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

EUO is a Material Condition Precedent Claim Properly Denied for Refusal to Testify at EUO Post 4936 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/euo-material-condition-precedent-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-exccc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. See the full video at and at Erin Hughes appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) on her causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith arising after Farmers’ denial of Hughes’s property insurance claim because she refused to testify at a second examination under oath (EUO). In Erin Hughes v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, B331168, California Court of Appeals (November 8, 2024) the condition precedent was enforced. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Hughes is the owner of real property in Malibu (the property). In December 2020, Hughes obtained an insurance policy to cover the property for fire loss through the California FAIR Plan Association (FAIR Plan). Also in December 2020, Hughes obtained a homeowner’s insurance policy from Farmers to cover perils other than fire, including losses due to theft (the policy). One month later, in January 2021, the property sustained significant fire damage. Hughes contacted Farmers, which advised her that fire loss was not covered by her Farmers policy, and she would have to pursue any such claim through her FAIR Plan policy. Unhappy, on January 21, 2021, Hughes tendered a theft claim under the Farmers policy, asserting in excess of $2 million worth of personal property was stolen from the property. Farmers ultimately denied the claim on January 5, 2022, on the ground that Hughes failed to cooperate with Farmers’ investigation, including by failing to participate in a second examination under oath as required by the policy. Hughes’s Complaint Against Farmers One week after the denial of her claim, Hughes sued Farmers and alleged Farmers demanded “duplicative, onerous and/or unnecessary” documentation of stolen items. Further, she alleged Farmers subjected her to “two confrontational, accusatory and grueling examinations under oath.” Hughes alleged her second examination under oath had been “suspended due to [her] medical condition,” but Farmers disregarded her condition and demanded a third examination. Farmers’ Motion for Summary Judgment Farmers moved for summary judgment contending it properly denied Hughes’s theft claim based on her failure to cooperate with Farmers’ investigation of her claim as well as her material misrepresentations in obtaining the Farmers policy. In May 2021, as part of Farmers’ theft claim investigation, Hughes participated in an examination under oath. During the examination, Hughes’s counsel informed the Farmers attorney he had just sent more than 40 additional receipts that the attorney would be receiving shortly. Recognizing they would not have time to go through the new items that day and the examination would need to continue on a future date, the Farmers attorney proposed “continu[ing] to work with one another to identify what’s missing.” In response, Hughes and her counsel agreed, with Hughes stating she would be happy to get “every single thing that you need and I’ll send it to my attorney right away.” In October 2021, a second session of the examination under oath was held regarding documentation Hughes had produced during and after the first session. Hughes appeared remotely with counsel and before any questions were asked of her, she objected to a further examination. Hughes accused the Farmers attorney of interrogating her “like a fucking criminal” and stated, “if you want to take my deposition . . . you are going to take a second deposition in court, and that’s going to be a formal deposition.” Hughes’s remote connection then cut out, and her counsel indicated she would not proceed with the examination. Farmers informed Hughes that it was denying coverage based on her failure to cooperate with Farmers’ investigation and particularly her refusal to proceed with the second examination under oath. Trial Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment and Denial of Hughes’s Continuance Request and Motion for New Trial The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers. Noting an insurer has “an absolute right” to require the insured to submit to an examination under oath “as long as the insurer exercises the right reasonably,” the court determined Hughes had not shown Farmers acted unreasonably. The court concluded summary judgment was appropriate “based solely on failure to cooperate.” DISCUSSION The trial court properly concluded there was no genuine dispute that Hughes’s failure to participate in an examination under oath constituted a material breach of the policy; accordingly, Farmers was excused from having to pay on Hughes’s claim. The right to require the insured to submit to an examination under oath concerning all proper subjects of inquiry is reasonable as a matter of law. An insured’s compliance with a policy requirement to submit to an examination under oath is a prerequisite to the right to receive benefits under the policy. Because Hughes refused to cooperate with Farmers’ investigation by participating in and completing her examination under oath, she cannot establish her own performance under the policy. Breach of Implied Covenant Claim The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based on general contract law and the long-standing rule that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. Hughes’s claim for bad faith fails as a matter of law. ZALMA OPINION Wildfires tend to destroy everything. That is why insurers are unwilling to write fire insurance in Malibu and other areas prone to wildfires and obtain fire insurance from the Fair Plan, an organization designed to cover uninsurable risks. Because of the destruction done by a wildfire or a dwelling fire a $2 million dollar theft loss after a fire is questionable and a good reason to take a thorough EUO. Farmers tried to do so and Hughes refused without reason after admitting she left open much investigation elements at the agreed conclusion of the first session and an agreement to a second only to refuse. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg

Occam’s Razor Exclusion for Work Performed by Insured Defeats Claim for Construction Defects Post 4935 Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/gT_NsMHv, see the full video at https://lnkd.in/gqkPHYbp and at https://lnkd.in/gEEXkUe3, and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. The question presented to the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals was whether a contractor’s CGL insurance policy covers general damage to a non-defective part of the contractor’s project resulting from a subcontractor’s defective work on a different part of that project. APPLICATION OF OCCAM’S RAZOR The analysis technique that proposes that the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the more complex. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Applying Massachusetts law, the district court concluded that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci in Admiral Insurance Company, Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Great American Assurance Company v. Tocci Building Corporation, Tocci Residential LLC, John L. Tocci, Sr., No. 22-1462, United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit (November 8, 2024) and Tocci appealed. From 2013 to 2016, Tocci was the construction manager for an apartment project owned by Toll JM EB Residential Urban Renewal LLC (“Toll”). There were several work quality issues and delays on the project, and Toll eventually terminated Tocci in March 2016 for alleged mismanagement of the project. Toll sued with allegations regarding instances of defective work leading to property damage. The allegations included defective work by Tocci’s subcontractors resulting in various instances of property damage to non-defective work on the project, including (1) damage to sheetrock resulting from faulty roof work; (2) mold formation resulting from inadequate sheathing and water getting into the building; and (3) damage to a concrete slab, wood framing, and underground pipes resulting from soil settlement due to improper backfill and soil compaction. DUTY TO DEFEND Tocci sought defense and indemnity coverage under the Admiral insurance policies. Admiral denied coverage. The district court granted Admiral’s motion on duty to defend because the damage alleged in Toll’s complaint did not qualify as “property damage” as defined in the policy because the allegations consisted entirely of damage at Tocci’s own project. ANALYSIS The First Circuit considered three steps to the coverage analysis: (1) Do the damages alleged in the action fall within the scope of coverage?; (2) if so, do the exclusions to coverage apply?; and (3) if so, do any exceptions to the exclusions apply? The First Circuit noted that there is a sharp split of authority on whether damage to non-defective work resulting from a subcontractor’s defective work constitutes “property damage” or is caused by an “occurrence.” The First Circuit decided to avoid the issues of what constitutes “property damage” by focusing on the exclusions which were sufficient to resolve the complete dispute. THE HOLDING There are two “Damage to Property” exclusions that provide that there is no coverage for “property damage” to: that particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations; or that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it. The First Circuit, applying Occam’s Razor, focused its analysis on the exclusion it concluded covers the allegations in the Toll complaint. Since the complaint alleges damage resulting from Tocci’s “incorrectly performed” work on the entire project “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘[Tocci’s] work’ was incorrectly performed on it” refers to the entirety of the project where Tocci was the general contractor charged with supervising and managing the project as a whole. Therefore, the First Circuit concluded that Admiral met its burden of establishing that the Toll action only alleges damage falling within the exclusion and that there was no exception to that exclusion that applied. ZALMA OPINION This is a case of a court applying Occam’s Razor, by picking an easy and obvious solution – the application of an exclusion – and avoiding the problem of different court rulings on coverage about “property damage” and “occurence.” Since the exclusion clearly applied there was no duty to defend. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk Subscribe to my substack at https://lnkd.in/gmmzUVBy

Chutzpah – STOLI Fraudster Claims Hardship Felon Seeks Release from Home Confinement in Luxury Apartment in New York City Post 4931 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chutzpah-stoli-fraudster-claims-hardship-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-8jbhc, see the full video at and at and https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. Insurance Fraud is a serious crime, especially when it takes advantage of the elderly to defraud insurers in a Stranger Originated Life Insurance (STOLI) scheme. In United States Of America v. Michael Binday, No. 12 CR 152 (CM), United States District Court, S.D. New York (November 4, 2024) the defendant continued to use the wealth he gained from his fraud to impose on the courts of the United States with frivolous and unfounded motions. BACKGROUND Michael Binday was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment after being found guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, as well as actual mail and wire fraud. The evidence at trial established that Binday led his codefendants in a scheme designed to procure “stranger-originated life insurance” (or “STOLI”) policies-policies on the lives of seniors for the benefit of investors who were strangers to them- by means of fraudulent applications. Binday spent the first five years of his sentence at FCI Otisville. But in September 2021, during the height of the COVID-19 Pandemic, the Bureau of Prisons released Binday to serve his sentence on home confinement. Thus, Binday has spent the last three-plus years serving his sentence in his luxury apartment on the upper westside of Manhattan. His sentence is scheduled to end on September 20, 2025. Binday filed: (1) a motion for compassionate release and (2) a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to vacate the judgement of this Court dated May 23, 2018, denying his first petition. Michael Binday and his two codefendants, James Kergil and Mark Resnick, were found guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud; mail fraud; and wire fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud insurance companies which the defendants purported to serve as agents. Binday led his codefendants in a scheme designed to procure “stranger-originated life insurance” (or “STOLI”) policies-policies on the lives of seniors for the benefit of investors who were strangers to them- by means of fraudulent applications. Over the course of their scheme, the defendants submitted at least 92 fraudulent applications, resulting in the issuance of 74 policies with a total face value of over $100 million. These policies generated roughly $11.7 million in commissions to the defendants. Binday was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment. BINDAY SURRENDERS Binday surrendered on July 1,2016, to FCI Otisville to commence his term of imprisonment and immediately filed motions for compassionate release, reversal of his convictions, and multiple other motions. On July 1, 2024, Binday-who is serving his sentence in his Manhattan apartment- filed a renewed motion for compassionate release. Binday Failed to Demonstrate Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances As a threshold matter, it is worth emphasizing that Binday is not asking to be released from prison, but rather, to be relieved of the inconveniences associated with the rules of home confinement. He has served the last 38 months in his apartment on the upper west side of Manhattan (not at all what the Court intended when he was sentenced). How much more inconvenient it would be if he were back at Otisville- where the Court intended that he would serve his sentence. Binday’s crimes were serious. As the court explained when he was sentenced to 144 months in prison: Venality, rampant mendacity, the creation of false documents, obstruction of efforts by the victims to ascertain the truth, obstruction of regulators and the government’s efforts to learn the truth, Binday’s actions were precisely the sort of criminality that has left large segments of our society convince that all businessmen are crooks. Insurance fraud may not qualify as a crime of violence within the meaning of the federal sentencing system and that, unfortunately, is why it is all too often punished not with the severity that it deserves. As it is, Binday’s home confinement means that he is subject to far less stringent conditions than he would be otherwise. In that regard, he got more of a break than he deserves. The motion for compassionate release was denied. ZALMA OPINION STOLI fraud is a type of fraud on insurers that effects the straw buyers, usually older men and women who have no need for life insurance, is a truly venal act that deserves serious punishment. Binday stole millions from insurers, owns a luxury apartment in the Upper West Side of New York, and wants to be released from the confinement when he should have stayed in federal prison. He has abused the courts with his multiple motions and appeals and will serve out the remainder of his sentence and the DOJ and FBI should look into his current conduct since there is, in my opinion, the possibility that he is funding his attorneys fees with more fraud. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Bad Faith Set Up Fails Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bad-faith-set-up-fails-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-jllxc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. Inadequate Information Made Refusal to Pay Policy Limits Not Bad Faith INADEQUATE MEDICAL AUTHORIZATION USED TO CAUSE INSURER TO REFUSE SETTLEMENT DEMAND Post 4930 Kara Flick appealed from the judgment after a jury rejected her claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Flick contends the judgment should be reversed due to juror misconduct. In KARA FLICK v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, B330507, California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division (November 5, 2024) the Court of Appeals resolved the dispute. FACTUAL HISTORY After sustaining injuries in an automobile accident caused by Francisco Reyes, Jr., Flick had her attorney send Reyes's insurer, the United Services Automobile Association (USAA), a letter explaining the severity of her injuries and an authorization for the release of her medical records. Flick's attorney followed up with a settlement demand two months later, requesting that USAA pay Flick the entirety of Reyes's $100,000 policy limit in exchange for a release of liability. Attached to the demand was a single medical record from Flick's neurologist. USAA investigated Flick's claim and determined it did not have sufficient information to accept or reject her demand. Flick then filed a personal injury lawsuit against Reyes. The jury found in her favor and awarded nearly $1.7 million in damages. Flick, with an assignment from the Reyes, sued USAA for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. TRIAL At trial, a USAA claims adjustor admitted that Reyes was fully at fault for the accident with Flick. Reyes could therefore be exposed to liability in excess of his policy limits-if Flick provided sufficient documentation to support her claim. USAA's expert on insurance claims handling and another of its claims service managers both agreed with the supervisor that Flick's authorization was invalid and inadequate to allow USAA to obtain Flick's medical records. USAA needed additional records before it could determine the value of Flick's claim. Those records could have included the medical bills Flick provided to her own insurance company, the multiple doctor's notes she had excusing her from work, or the thumb drive recording her purported speech problems, all of which were entered into evidence at her personal injury trial. Because they were not provided to USAA, it was "very difficult to place a value on" Flick's claim. Flick's expert testified that USAA's handling of the settlement demand "was clearly unreasonable." Flick also did not respond to USAA's requests for additional information. By a vote of nine to three, the jury found that Flick did not make a reasonable settlement demand of USAA and rejected her claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court polled the jury, and each juror confirmed their vote. DISCUSSION The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Flick's new trial motion. USAA successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice by showing there is no reasonable probability that the juror, D.C.'s misconduct by not explaining he did not hear all of the adjuster's testimony, actually harmed Flick. Much of the adjustor's testimony consisted of facts regarding his communications with Flick's attorney - facts that were undisputed. What was disputed-whether Flick's settlement demand was reasonable-was the subject of other witness testimony, including USAA's expert on insurance claims handling, its supervising claims service manager, Flick's personal injury attorney, and her expert witness on insurance claims handling. What the admitted evidence showed was that D.C. confirmed multiple times that he voted that Flick did not make a reasonable settlement demand: Based on this record there was no reasonable probability that D.C.'s alleged juror misconduct actually harmed Flick. ZALMA OPINION The tort of bad faith arose from abuse by insurers on those they insured. Since its adoption in California about three quarters of a century ago, the abuse has been turned on to insurers. Ms. Flick's counsel placed a demand for settlement on USAA that it could not reasonably and in good faith to its insured, Reyes, because it was incomplete and inadequately supported and forced Flick and Reyes go through a trial where she received an uncollectible judgment against Reyes in hopes of a gigantic bad faith judgment. After much litigation and USAA spending a great deal to defend itself she received the $100,000 policy limit. USAA was punished but neither Flick nor her lawyers profited from the scheme or the appeal. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. 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Chiropractor Disciplined for Improper Billing Chiropractor Lies to Board and Loses Right to Practice Post 4930 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chiropractor-disciplined-improper-billing-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-4qjdc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. This appeal arises from an attempt by the state of Illinois to impose discipline upon plaintiff Christopher D. Leone, D.C., due to certain improper activities performed as a licensed chiropractor in the state of Illinois. In Christopher D. Leone, D.C. v. The Department Of Financial And Professional Regulation, Division Of Professional Regulation; and Cecilia Abundis, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Director of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, No. 4-22-0753, 2024 IL App (4th) 220753-U, Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District (November 6, 2024) the Court of Appeal resolved the multiple claims of the chiropractor. BACKGROUND Leone has practiced as a chiropractor since 1999 and initially practiced in the state of Washington. The matter was resolved pursuant to an informal disposition via stipulation. Leone began practicing in Illinois in 2004, and in 2010 and a consent order was issued pursuant to which Leone admitted to the allegations and was reprimanded with a $5000 fine and a requirement that he undertake 20 hours of continuing education; 10 of those hours were to focus on Medicare billing and insurance coding and another 10 on record keeping. In 2013, the United States alleged that Leone “knowingly and fraudulently” submitted Medicare claims of less than $1000 for one-on-one physical therapy services that were not provided. Following negotiation, the parties entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which Leone pleaded guilty to the one-count information and stipulated to a factual basis for his plea. Shortly after the Medicare fraud charge was filed against Leone, the State filed a five-count complaint alleging multiple violations of the Medical Practices Act of 1987 (Act). During the litigation, Leone applied to renew his chiropractic license. One of the questions on the application asked whether he had been convicted of any criminal offense, state or federal, since July 2011; Leone answered, “No,” failing to document the Medicare fraud conviction. Attempting to explain his federal guilty plea, Leone said that he was unable to modify the language in the plea agreement, as “the time for negotiations had run out” and the plea was a “take-it-or-leave-it” proposition. Leone read the plea agreement line by line and, although he claimed it contained false information, he signed it. ALJ Report and Recommendation The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued his report and recommendation, finding that, pursuant to the guilty plea in the federal case, Leone had admitted that his patients performed physical therapy on their own without supervision. Also, Leone admitted in his plea that entries in patient records indicating that they received hands-on or one-on-one physical therapy were false. Further, the guilty plea established that Leone knowingly submitted claims to Medicare for services that he did not provide. Leone had also billed private insurers numerous times under the same code as Medicare. The conviction also established that he engaged in false billing and false entries in patient records. The ALJ recommended an indefinite suspension of Leone’s license for a minimum of two years. An expert testified that chiropractors who engaged in Medicare fraud violated several tenets of chiropractic ethics. There was a pattern of overcharging for services that were not provided, false notations in patient records to support the false charges, and the submission of false claims to insurance that went on for at least five years. Leone obtained fees by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and those actions fell below the professional and ethical standards required of chiropractors in Illinois. Leone’s conduct, along with his past disciplinary history, “demonstrate[d] a pattern of behavior that [was] not acceptable.” ANALYSIS It was undisputed that Leone submitted charges under billing code 97110. Leone pled guilty to submitting a false demand for payment upon the United States. In his plea, Leone admitted to billing for services that were not actually provided to his patients as claimed, “and the instruments containing the demands for payment of public money, therefore were false when they were submitted” and “were submitted to Medicare with the knowledge that he did not perform the service charged.” The guilty plea supports the conclusion that Leone knowingly and intentionally submitted claims for reimbursement for services provided under code 97110 where the services did not meet the requirements to be paid under that code. This pattern went on for approximately five years, resulting in 1324 false claims in the amount of $93,900. The Department established a violation of the Act where Leone failed to note the federal conviction on his renewal application. Discipline A review of the initial circuit court order in this matter reveals that it merely recommended that the Department consider probation as a punishment; it did not make a ruling to that effect. There was no abuse of discretion in the discipline imposed. For the reasons stated, the Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and affirm the Director’s decision. ZALMA OPINION Leone successfully committed fraud on the United States, the state of Illinois, and the insurance industry by falsely billing services he did not provide. He pleaded guilty to one count of Federal Health Insurance fraud and then lied to the state of Illinois when he applied to renew his license. With lawyers and retained experts he delayed the sanction for years. The Court of Appeals finally resolved the multiple disputes and applied an appropriate sanction and suspension of his license. He should consider himself lucky that he was not prosecuted criminally by the state and the US Government accepted his plea. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. 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No Breach of Contract no Bad Faith Happy Veterans Day to My Fellow Veterans Some Claims Proper Some Not Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/happy-veterans-day-my-fellow-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-ovpec, shttps://www.linkedin.com/pulse/happy-veterans-day-my-fellow-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-ovpec and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. Post 4929 Vepo Design Corporation and its officers (collectively, “Vepo”) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their breach of contract and bad faith claims against American Economy Insurance Company (“AEIC”). Vepo’s claims relate to AEIC’s denial of coverage following a fire in a laundromat, known as the “Central Laundromat,” which Vepo was developing. In Vepo Design Corporation, et al. v. American Economy Insurance Company, No. 23-55634, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (November 4, 2024) the issues were resolved serially. DECISIONS Business Income The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AEIC on Vepo’s business income claim, which concerns income Vepo contends it would have earned operating the Central Laundromat if the fire had not occurred. AEIC argued that Vepo’s claim for lost income was too speculative given that the Central Laundromat was still under construction and Vepo had not secured additional financing to own and operate it. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Vepo as the non-moving party the Ninth Circuit concluded that there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact and that Vepo’s claim for lost business income is not unduly speculative. There is evidence that Vepo was contemplating an arrangement under which it would own and operate the Central Laundromat for a period of time before selling it, and that Vepo later engaged in similar arrangements for other laundromats. Vepo, which was experienced in the laundromat industry, also demonstrated that it had a history of securing financing for its laundromat projects and that it intended to refinance the Central Laundromat once a certificate of occupancy was received. Although Vepo had not secured refinancing for the Central Laundromat as of the time of the fire, Vepo’s Principal Owner stated in her declaration and confirmed at her deposition that it was too early to do so in the project timeline. That Vepo had yet to refinance does not render its claim too speculative as a matter of law and its losses are for a jury to decide. Extra Expense The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AEIC for the extra expenses that Vepo allegedly incurred in storing laundry equipment in a warehouse owned by Vepo’s sister company following the fire. While the policy only required the expense to be incurred, not paid, there was insufficient evidence to create a triable issue over whether the expense was incurred at all. No payment changed hands between the two entities, and there is no accounting record showing that Vepo was liable for the storage amount. When the same person signed as representative of both entities, does not create a genuine dispute of material fact. Lost Profits The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Vepo’s claim for lost profits on the prospective sale of the laundromat. Even assuming that such a loss would be covered under the policy, the claim fails because the policy limited coverage to losses that occur within one year of the incident. Vepo’s plan called for it to own and operate the Central Laundromat for at least one year after opening, which would place any hypothetical sale more than a year after the pre-opening fire. Individual Personal Property Claims The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for AEIC on the claims by the individual plaintiffs for their own personal property that was allegedly lost in the fire. As the district court correctly found, Vepo did not identify what individual property was lost or its worth. The individual plaintiffs’ claims were too unsupported to create a triable issue. Bad Faith The Ninth Circuit partially reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Vepo’s bad faith claim, to the extent of the single insurance claim it allowed to go forward-the business income claim. The district court may permit any further motions practice on the bad faith claim as it deems appropriate. However, it affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the bad faith claim insofar as that claim is premised on any of the other breach of contract claims to which AEIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is never a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing if there was no improper denial of coverage under the policy. ZALMA OPINION The importance of this case is the reiteration of the law that there can never be a viable tort of bad faith if there is no improper denial of a claim by breach of the insurance contract. If the one cause of action remaining was breached in bad faith and there was no genuine dispute over coverage, that cause can be brought for bad faith damages. The other decisions of the Ninth Circuit were obvious and well reasoned. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

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