• Remdesivir – Big Pharma’s Unsafe & Ineffective Pre-Jab Drug
    https://tinyurl.com/mwwbhnjz

    SUMMARY: Today I’m entering back into the realm of exposing Medical Tyranny. I’m sharing a Vigilant News (VNN) post highlighting Big Pharma’s pre-mRNA push for Remdesivir was evil since the drug had a proven detrimental track record of causing more medical harm than good. …TAKE A LOOK includes Propaganda Exposed video sourcing!
    #RemsesivirDangerous #PropagandaExposed
    Remdesivir – Big Pharma’s Unsafe & Ineffective Pre-Jab Drug https://tinyurl.com/mwwbhnjz SUMMARY: Today I’m entering back into the realm of exposing Medical Tyranny. I’m sharing a Vigilant News (VNN) post highlighting Big Pharma’s pre-mRNA push for Remdesivir was evil since the drug had a proven detrimental track record of causing more medical harm than good. …TAKE A LOOK includes Propaganda Exposed video sourcing! #RemsesivirDangerous #PropagandaExposed
    TINYURL.COM
    Remdesivir – Big Pharma’s Unsafe & Ineffective Pre-Jab Drug
    John R. Houk, Blog Editor © November 17, 2024 Today I’m entering back into the realm of exposing Medical Tyranny. I’m sharing a Vigilant News (VNN) post highlighting Big Pharma’s pre-mRNA push for …
    0 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 934 مشاهدة
  • Detailed Analysis: Why Arabs Lose Wars?
    This video based by article is a personal account of U.S. Army Colonel Norvell DeAtkine's experience in dealing with Arab militaries for over 40 years.

    This video provides an in-depth analysis of the performance of Arabic-speaking armies in the modern era, examining their struggles and challenges across various historical conflicts. It begins by exploring how Egyptian regular forces faced difficulties against Yemeni irregulars in the 1960s, a period marked by intense military strategy shifts in the Middle East. Similarly, Syrians managed to assert control in Lebanon during the mid-1970s, but only through the use of overwhelming weaponry and numbers, rather than tactical brilliance.

    One of the most notable examples of ineffectiveness came from the Iraqis during the 1980s when they were pitted against an Iranian military deeply affected by revolutionary turmoil. Despite the disarray in Iran, the Iraqis failed to secure a decisive victory and could not win a three-decade-long war against the Kurds. The Arab military performance on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait war was similarly underwhelming, highlighting the mediocre combat history of the region's forces, especially when compared to the more formidable Allied Forces and Axis Powers of World War II.

    This video seeks to uncover why this unimpressive record persists, delving into a myriad of factors—economic, ideological, and technical—that have historically hampered Arab armies. Yet, perhaps the most critical factor is cultural, encompassing certain societal attributes that inhibit these forces from producing an effective military presence on the battlefield. The insights you will hear are grounded in the personal experiences of Norville B. De Atkin, who spent nearly three decades in the Middle East as a U.S. military attaché and security assistance officer. Through his lens, we gain an understanding of how military tactics are developed and implemented—or, as often is the case, how they fall short—due to deeply ingrained cultural practices.

    It's a well-established truth in military history that an army fights as it is trained. Atkin's firsthand observations of Arab military training reveal much about how these forces approach modern warfare and why they frequently struggle to meet the demands of strategic warfare. Despite nearly 25 years passing since his initial assessments, it appears that little has changed in the effectiveness of these armies, especially when compared to other global forces.

    The video also critiques the problematic nature of incorporating culture into strategic assessments. Historically, this approach has led to wild distortions, as seen with the U.S. Army in the 1930s, which misjudged the Japanese national character, leading to incorrect assumptions about their technological capabilities. Hitler's underestimation of the United States as a "mongrel society" similarly backfired, showing the dangers of relying too heavily on cultural stereotypes in warfare. These examples underscore the risk of making assumptions about military abilities based on cultural attributes, which often leads to overconfidence or, conversely, underestimation of an adversary's capabilities.

    The video also touches on the evolution of military subculture over time, noting how past performances can lead to erroneous conclusions about future conflicts. The dismal French performance in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War misled the German high command into overestimating the French Army's capabilities during World War I. Conversely, Israeli generals underestimated the Egyptian Army in 1973, based on their lackluster performance in the 1967 war. Such examples illustrate how combat history can be a double-edged sword, influencing strategic decisions in both positive and negative ways.

    Furthermore, the video explores how cultural factors—such as the highly centralized command structures in Arab militaries—stifle initiative and flexibility. This rigid hierarchy often leads to a lack of combined arms operations, where cooperation between different military branches, such as naval battles and air warfare, is critical for success.

    In Western forces like the U.S. military, NCOs play a vital role in bridging the gap between officers and enlisted soldiers, fostering a sense of unit cohesion and military innovation. However, in many Arabic-speaking armies, NCOs are either absent or non-functional, leading to a breakdown in discipline and effectiveness, particularly in the stress of combat. This lack of a professional NCO corps further exacerbates the challenges these armies face in executing military tactics and maintaining military history.
    Detailed Analysis: Why Arabs Lose Wars? This video based by article is a personal account of U.S. Army Colonel Norvell DeAtkine's experience in dealing with Arab militaries for over 40 years. This video provides an in-depth analysis of the performance of Arabic-speaking armies in the modern era, examining their struggles and challenges across various historical conflicts. It begins by exploring how Egyptian regular forces faced difficulties against Yemeni irregulars in the 1960s, a period marked by intense military strategy shifts in the Middle East. Similarly, Syrians managed to assert control in Lebanon during the mid-1970s, but only through the use of overwhelming weaponry and numbers, rather than tactical brilliance. One of the most notable examples of ineffectiveness came from the Iraqis during the 1980s when they were pitted against an Iranian military deeply affected by revolutionary turmoil. Despite the disarray in Iran, the Iraqis failed to secure a decisive victory and could not win a three-decade-long war against the Kurds. The Arab military performance on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait war was similarly underwhelming, highlighting the mediocre combat history of the region's forces, especially when compared to the more formidable Allied Forces and Axis Powers of World War II. This video seeks to uncover why this unimpressive record persists, delving into a myriad of factors—economic, ideological, and technical—that have historically hampered Arab armies. Yet, perhaps the most critical factor is cultural, encompassing certain societal attributes that inhibit these forces from producing an effective military presence on the battlefield. The insights you will hear are grounded in the personal experiences of Norville B. De Atkin, who spent nearly three decades in the Middle East as a U.S. military attaché and security assistance officer. Through his lens, we gain an understanding of how military tactics are developed and implemented—or, as often is the case, how they fall short—due to deeply ingrained cultural practices. It's a well-established truth in military history that an army fights as it is trained. Atkin's firsthand observations of Arab military training reveal much about how these forces approach modern warfare and why they frequently struggle to meet the demands of strategic warfare. Despite nearly 25 years passing since his initial assessments, it appears that little has changed in the effectiveness of these armies, especially when compared to other global forces. The video also critiques the problematic nature of incorporating culture into strategic assessments. Historically, this approach has led to wild distortions, as seen with the U.S. Army in the 1930s, which misjudged the Japanese national character, leading to incorrect assumptions about their technological capabilities. Hitler's underestimation of the United States as a "mongrel society" similarly backfired, showing the dangers of relying too heavily on cultural stereotypes in warfare. These examples underscore the risk of making assumptions about military abilities based on cultural attributes, which often leads to overconfidence or, conversely, underestimation of an adversary's capabilities. The video also touches on the evolution of military subculture over time, noting how past performances can lead to erroneous conclusions about future conflicts. The dismal French performance in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War misled the German high command into overestimating the French Army's capabilities during World War I. Conversely, Israeli generals underestimated the Egyptian Army in 1973, based on their lackluster performance in the 1967 war. Such examples illustrate how combat history can be a double-edged sword, influencing strategic decisions in both positive and negative ways. Furthermore, the video explores how cultural factors—such as the highly centralized command structures in Arab militaries—stifle initiative and flexibility. This rigid hierarchy often leads to a lack of combined arms operations, where cooperation between different military branches, such as naval battles and air warfare, is critical for success. In Western forces like the U.S. military, NCOs play a vital role in bridging the gap between officers and enlisted soldiers, fostering a sense of unit cohesion and military innovation. However, in many Arabic-speaking armies, NCOs are either absent or non-functional, leading to a breakdown in discipline and effectiveness, particularly in the stress of combat. This lack of a professional NCO corps further exacerbates the challenges these armies face in executing military tactics and maintaining military history.
    0 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 2كيلو بايت مشاهدة
  • German CDC Covid Data Leaked – Shots Harmful & Ineffective — Report https://www.infowars.com/posts/german-cdc-covid-data-leaked-shots-harmful-ineffective-report/
    German CDC Covid Data Leaked – Shots Harmful & Ineffective — Report https://www.infowars.com/posts/german-cdc-covid-data-leaked-shots-harmful-ineffective-report/
    Angry
    Like
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    0 التعليقات 1 المشاركات 624 مشاهدة
  • MAJOR CONCESSION!! - AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL PUBLISHES THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE COVID 'VACCINE'

    https://old.bitchute.com/video/1EHisRN0eMwD/
    MAJOR CONCESSION!! - AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL PUBLISHES THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE COVID 'VACCINE' https://old.bitchute.com/video/1EHisRN0eMwD/
    OLD.BITCHUTE.COM
    MAJOR CONCESSION!! - AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL PUBLISHES THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE COVID 'VACCINE'
    You just WONT BELIEVE what has just been published in the leading Australian GP journal I never thought I would see this day MRNA HARMS 🇦🇺Land Down Under🇦🇺 Boost Us X Link:- https://x.com/HopeRising19/status/1808028721250816257
    Angry
    1
    1 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 487 مشاهدة
  • You’re Probably Taking your Vitamin D Wrong, and it Could be Dangerous (& Ineffective)

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIctSDVYchQ&list=TLPQMjcwNjIwMjRuGjHMcDjHVg&index=4
    You’re Probably Taking your Vitamin D Wrong, and it Could be Dangerous (& Ineffective) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIctSDVYchQ&list=TLPQMjcwNjIwMjRuGjHMcDjHVg&index=4
    Like
    1
    0 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 563 مشاهدة
  • https://southfront.press/u-s-admits-glsdb-wunderwaffe-was-rendered-ineffective-by-russian-electronic-warfare/
    https://southfront.press/u-s-admits-glsdb-wunderwaffe-was-rendered-ineffective-by-russian-electronic-warfare/
    SOUTHFRONT.PRESS
    U.S. Admits GLSDB 'Wunderwaffe' Was Rendered Ineffective By Russian Electronic Warfare
    Much-vaunted rocket-launched glide bombs supplied to Ukraine by the United States “didn’t work” due to a combination of mud, technical...
    0 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 741 مشاهدة
  • Russian Roulette for Real - Unsafe and Ineffective - Dangerous https://twitter.com/i/status/1778813380519702979
    Russian Roulette for Real - Unsafe and Ineffective - Dangerous https://twitter.com/i/status/1778813380519702979
    0 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 492 مشاهدة
  • Dr. Yeadon Apparently is Supportive of Mark Sexton Assertions of mRNA Criminality

    SUMMARY: Dr. Mike Yeadon posted an email he sent to Ben Bates on his Telegram Channel supportive of the Mark Sexton assertion of mRNA criminality perpetrated on a trusting gullible public who have fallen for the mantra, “Trust the Science”. The part that interests me is his explanation of ineffectiveness & lethality. …TAKE A LOOK: https://bit.ly/3IBn2sU
    #mRNACriminality
    Dr. Yeadon Apparently is Supportive of Mark Sexton Assertions of mRNA Criminality SUMMARY: Dr. Mike Yeadon posted an email he sent to Ben Bates on his Telegram Channel supportive of the Mark Sexton assertion of mRNA criminality perpetrated on a trusting gullible public who have fallen for the mantra, “Trust the Science”. The part that interests me is his explanation of ineffectiveness & lethality. …TAKE A LOOK: https://bit.ly/3IBn2sU #mRNACriminality
    BIT.LY
    Dr. Yeadon Apparently is Supportive of Mark Sexton Assertions of mRNA Criminality
    John R. Houk, Blog Editor © March 13, 2024 Dr. Mike Yeadon posted an email he sent to Ben Bates on his Telegram Channel Dr Mike Yead...
    0 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 1كيلو بايت مشاهدة
  • MK-ULTRA BACKGROUND & HISTORY

    There is only ONE CURE for the #Evil people involved in secret societies!

    They must be terminated, and sent to their creator for judgement

    Anything less is ineffective

    https://www.bitchute.com/video/8UdIdnXB0mJ5/
    MK-ULTRA BACKGROUND & HISTORY There is only ONE CURE for the #Evil people involved in secret societies! They must be terminated, and sent to their creator for judgement Anything less is ineffective https://www.bitchute.com/video/8UdIdnXB0mJ5/
    0 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 616 مشاهدة
  • https://expose-news.com/2024/02/13/cdcs-own-scientists-found-masks-ineffective-for-covid-but-agency-recommended-them-anyway/
    https://expose-news.com/2024/02/13/cdcs-own-scientists-found-masks-ineffective-for-covid-but-agency-recommended-them-anyway/
    EXPOSE-NEWS.COM
    CDC’s Own Scientists Found Masks Ineffective for COVID — But Agency Recommended Them Anyway.
    January 2024 we are still reading that hospitals have asked visitors to its A&E department to start wearing face masks again. How can we ever trust medical professionals ever again knowing that…
    0 التعليقات 0 المشاركات 754 مشاهدة
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