Requiring an Insurer to Waive its Right to Subrogation is a Valid & Enforceable Contract Waiver of Subrogation Applies in Marine Insurance Policy Post 4938 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/requiring-insurer-waive-its-right-subrogation-valid-zalma-esq-cfe-gkn3c/, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog. Competing motions for summary judgment were presented to the USDC for the Eastern District of Louisiana in a limitation-of-liability action arising from the listing and capsizing of the liftboat RAM XVIII. The motions present the principal question whether Fieldwood (charterer of the liftboat) must defend and indemnify Aries (owner of the liftboat) and U.S. Specialty (Aries’s insurer) under a master time charter agreement from the personal-injury claims brought by employees of Fluid Crane & Construction, Inc. and United Fire and Safety, LLC (Fieldwood’s subcontractors) who were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized. Fieldwood moved for partial summary judgment enforcing waivers of subrogation in the master time charter agreement and the relevant U.S. Specialty insurance policy. In The Matter Of Aries Marine Corporation, et al., Civil Action Nos. 19-10850, 19-13138, United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana (November 20, 2024) the USDC resolved the disputes. BACKGROUND The USDC resolved a five-year-old limitation-of-liability action that arose from the listing and capsizing of the liftboat RAM XVIII in the Gulf of Mexico. Aries chartered the RAM XVIII to Fieldwood under a master time charter agreement (the “Time Charter”) in relation to work being performed on one of Fieldwood’s offshore platforms. Under those Master Services Contracts, Fluid Crane and United Fire sent employees to work on Fieldwood’s platform; those employees were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized. U.S. Specialty, for its part, underwrote an insurance policy (the “Policy”) that provided Aries with certain coverages in effect when the RAM XVIII capsized. Six employees of Fluid Crane and one employee of United Fire-all of whom were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized-brought personal injury claims against Aries. The motions before the Court present the principal question whether Fieldwood must defend and indemnify Aries and U.S. Specialty from those personal-injury claims. THE TIME CHARTER Section 10 features a waiver-of-subrogation provision mandating that “[u]nderwriters of all policies of insurance required [by Section 10] shall waive their rights of subrogation against the Charterer Group,” which includes Fieldwood. THE POLICY The Policy provides coverage to Aries for protection and indemnity, including coverage for personal-injury liability. The Policy includes a waiver-of-subrogation provision that applies to the protection-and-indemnity coverage. A separate section of the Policy-governing hull-insurance coverage contains a waiver-of-subrogation provision and a provision naming Fieldwood as an additional insured. THE MASTER SERVICES CONTRACTS. Fieldwood executed the Master Services Contracts with Fluid Crane and United Fire, respectively. Fluid Crane and United Fire agreed to indemnify the other entities involved from claims asserted by their own employees, as well as to be responsible for defense costs for such claims. ANALYSIS Fieldwood’s Motion Fieldwood moved the Court to grant partial summary judgment enforcing waivers of subrogation in the Time Charter and Policy and dismissing Aries’s crossclaim and U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention. The Court held that Fieldwood is entitled to partial summary judgment because a review of the Time Charter and the Policy confirms that both Aries and U.S. Specialty have waived their rights of subrogation against Fieldwood. U.S. Specialty Waived Its Rights of Subrogation The Policy unambiguously waives U.S. Specialty’s right of subrogation in favor of Fieldwood. The Policy features a waiver-of-subrogation provision. The Time Charter qualifies as a “written contract” that “require[s]” U.S. Specialty to waive its rights of subrogation against Fieldwood because the Time Charter features a waiver-of-subrogation provision mandating that “[u]nderwriters of all policies of insurance required [by Section 10 of the Time Charter] shall waive their rights of subrogation against the Charterer Group,” which is defined to include Fieldwood. Because a review of the Time Charter and the Policy confirms that U.S. Specialty unambiguously waived its rights of subrogation against Fieldwood, and because the claims asserted in U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention rest on a subrogation theory, the Court granted Fieldwood’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention. The USDC concluded that the waivers of subrogation in Fieldwood’s favor are enforceable, and Aries and U.S. Specialty have not adequately presented any argument that would allow the Court to hold that their claims for defense and indemnity can survive despite the enforceability of those waivers of subrogation. Fieldwood’s motion for partial summary judgment was GRANTED. ZALMA OPINION Insurance policies like the marine policy interpreted in this case contain standard language authorizing the insured to waive the insurers’ right of subrogation if it does so before there is a loss. Since the litigants sought subrogation recovery which it had waived by the standard language of its policy this five year long litigation was resolved by the acceptance of the waiver. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

The Great Deconstruction: Who Wins When We Lose? with Gregory Mannarino (Little By Little) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uY0kWTIsZq4&list=TLPQMTcxMTIwMjS1hoPLIHJjYw&index=12

Occam’s Razor Exclusion for Work Performed by Insured Defeats Claim for Construction Defects Post 4935 Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/gT_NsMHv, see the full video at https://lnkd.in/gqkPHYbp and at https://lnkd.in/gEEXkUe3, and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. The question presented to the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals was whether a contractor’s CGL insurance policy covers general damage to a non-defective part of the contractor’s project resulting from a subcontractor’s defective work on a different part of that project. APPLICATION OF OCCAM’S RAZOR The analysis technique that proposes that the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the more complex. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Applying Massachusetts law, the district court concluded that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci in Admiral Insurance Company, Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Great American Assurance Company v. Tocci Building Corporation, Tocci Residential LLC, John L. Tocci, Sr., No. 22-1462, United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit (November 8, 2024) and Tocci appealed. From 2013 to 2016, Tocci was the construction manager for an apartment project owned by Toll JM EB Residential Urban Renewal LLC (“Toll”). There were several work quality issues and delays on the project, and Toll eventually terminated Tocci in March 2016 for alleged mismanagement of the project. Toll sued with allegations regarding instances of defective work leading to property damage. The allegations included defective work by Tocci’s subcontractors resulting in various instances of property damage to non-defective work on the project, including (1) damage to sheetrock resulting from faulty roof work; (2) mold formation resulting from inadequate sheathing and water getting into the building; and (3) damage to a concrete slab, wood framing, and underground pipes resulting from soil settlement due to improper backfill and soil compaction. DUTY TO DEFEND Tocci sought defense and indemnity coverage under the Admiral insurance policies. Admiral denied coverage. The district court granted Admiral’s motion on duty to defend because the damage alleged in Toll’s complaint did not qualify as “property damage” as defined in the policy because the allegations consisted entirely of damage at Tocci’s own project. ANALYSIS The First Circuit considered three steps to the coverage analysis: (1) Do the damages alleged in the action fall within the scope of coverage?; (2) if so, do the exclusions to coverage apply?; and (3) if so, do any exceptions to the exclusions apply? The First Circuit noted that there is a sharp split of authority on whether damage to non-defective work resulting from a subcontractor’s defective work constitutes “property damage” or is caused by an “occurrence.” The First Circuit decided to avoid the issues of what constitutes “property damage” by focusing on the exclusions which were sufficient to resolve the complete dispute. THE HOLDING There are two “Damage to Property” exclusions that provide that there is no coverage for “property damage” to: that particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations; or that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it. The First Circuit, applying Occam’s Razor, focused its analysis on the exclusion it concluded covers the allegations in the Toll complaint. Since the complaint alleges damage resulting from Tocci’s “incorrectly performed” work on the entire project “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘[Tocci’s] work’ was incorrectly performed on it” refers to the entirety of the project where Tocci was the general contractor charged with supervising and managing the project as a whole. Therefore, the First Circuit concluded that Admiral met its burden of establishing that the Toll action only alleges damage falling within the exclusion and that there was no exception to that exclusion that applied. ZALMA OPINION This is a case of a court applying Occam’s Razor, by picking an easy and obvious solution – the application of an exclusion – and avoiding the problem of different court rulings on coverage about “property damage” and “occurence.” Since the exclusion clearly applied there was no duty to defend. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk Subscribe to my substack at https://lnkd.in/gmmzUVBy

Part 14 | work smarter not harder👷💯💡 #workers #construction #work #smart #job #viralvideo #shorts Part 20 | work smarter 👷💡💯 https://www.youtube.com/shorts/48wyOgq7Tns

Part 61 | How Does A $39/Hour Worker Work👷💯 #workers #construction #work #job #viralvideo #shorts Part 66 | work smarter 👷💡💯 https://www.youtube.com/shorts/saR00GTbzJM

part 25/ Daily life on construction sites with skilled workers https://www.youtube.com/shorts/NAA6PyI4kdc

No Breach of Contract no Bad Faith Happy Veterans Day to My Fellow Veterans Some Claims Proper Some Not Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/happy-veterans-day-my-fellow-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-ovpec, shttps://www.linkedin.com/pulse/happy-veterans-day-my-fellow-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-ovpec and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. Post 4929 Vepo Design Corporation and its officers (collectively, “Vepo”) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their breach of contract and bad faith claims against American Economy Insurance Company (“AEIC”). Vepo’s claims relate to AEIC’s denial of coverage following a fire in a laundromat, known as the “Central Laundromat,” which Vepo was developing. In Vepo Design Corporation, et al. v. American Economy Insurance Company, No. 23-55634, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (November 4, 2024) the issues were resolved serially. DECISIONS Business Income The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AEIC on Vepo’s business income claim, which concerns income Vepo contends it would have earned operating the Central Laundromat if the fire had not occurred. AEIC argued that Vepo’s claim for lost income was too speculative given that the Central Laundromat was still under construction and Vepo had not secured additional financing to own and operate it. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Vepo as the non-moving party the Ninth Circuit concluded that there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact and that Vepo’s claim for lost business income is not unduly speculative. There is evidence that Vepo was contemplating an arrangement under which it would own and operate the Central Laundromat for a period of time before selling it, and that Vepo later engaged in similar arrangements for other laundromats. Vepo, which was experienced in the laundromat industry, also demonstrated that it had a history of securing financing for its laundromat projects and that it intended to refinance the Central Laundromat once a certificate of occupancy was received. Although Vepo had not secured refinancing for the Central Laundromat as of the time of the fire, Vepo’s Principal Owner stated in her declaration and confirmed at her deposition that it was too early to do so in the project timeline. That Vepo had yet to refinance does not render its claim too speculative as a matter of law and its losses are for a jury to decide. Extra Expense The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AEIC for the extra expenses that Vepo allegedly incurred in storing laundry equipment in a warehouse owned by Vepo’s sister company following the fire. While the policy only required the expense to be incurred, not paid, there was insufficient evidence to create a triable issue over whether the expense was incurred at all. No payment changed hands between the two entities, and there is no accounting record showing that Vepo was liable for the storage amount. When the same person signed as representative of both entities, does not create a genuine dispute of material fact. Lost Profits The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Vepo’s claim for lost profits on the prospective sale of the laundromat. Even assuming that such a loss would be covered under the policy, the claim fails because the policy limited coverage to losses that occur within one year of the incident. Vepo’s plan called for it to own and operate the Central Laundromat for at least one year after opening, which would place any hypothetical sale more than a year after the pre-opening fire. Individual Personal Property Claims The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for AEIC on the claims by the individual plaintiffs for their own personal property that was allegedly lost in the fire. As the district court correctly found, Vepo did not identify what individual property was lost or its worth. The individual plaintiffs’ claims were too unsupported to create a triable issue. Bad Faith The Ninth Circuit partially reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Vepo’s bad faith claim, to the extent of the single insurance claim it allowed to go forward-the business income claim. The district court may permit any further motions practice on the bad faith claim as it deems appropriate. However, it affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the bad faith claim insofar as that claim is premised on any of the other breach of contract claims to which AEIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is never a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing if there was no improper denial of coverage under the policy. ZALMA OPINION The importance of this case is the reiteration of the law that there can never be a viable tort of bad faith if there is no improper denial of a claim by breach of the insurance contract. If the one cause of action remaining was breached in bad faith and there was no genuine dispute over coverage, that cause can be brought for bad faith damages. The other decisions of the Ninth Circuit were obvious and well reasoned. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

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