Requiring an Insurer to Waive its Right to Subrogation is a Valid & Enforceable Contract Waiver of Subrogation Applies in Marine Insurance Policy Post 4938 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/requiring-insurer-waive-its-right-subrogation-valid-zalma-esq-cfe-gkn3c/, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog. Competing motions for summary judgment were presented to the USDC for the Eastern District of Louisiana in a limitation-of-liability action arising from the listing and capsizing of the liftboat RAM XVIII. The motions present the principal question whether Fieldwood (charterer of the liftboat) must defend and indemnify Aries (owner of the liftboat) and U.S. Specialty (Aries’s insurer) under a master time charter agreement from the personal-injury claims brought by employees of Fluid Crane & Construction, Inc. and United Fire and Safety, LLC (Fieldwood’s subcontractors) who were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized. Fieldwood moved for partial summary judgment enforcing waivers of subrogation in the master time charter agreement and the relevant U.S. Specialty insurance policy. In The Matter Of Aries Marine Corporation, et al., Civil Action Nos. 19-10850, 19-13138, United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana (November 20, 2024) the USDC resolved the disputes. BACKGROUND The USDC resolved a five-year-old limitation-of-liability action that arose from the listing and capsizing of the liftboat RAM XVIII in the Gulf of Mexico. Aries chartered the RAM XVIII to Fieldwood under a master time charter agreement (the “Time Charter”) in relation to work being performed on one of Fieldwood’s offshore platforms. Under those Master Services Contracts, Fluid Crane and United Fire sent employees to work on Fieldwood’s platform; those employees were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized. U.S. Specialty, for its part, underwrote an insurance policy (the “Policy”) that provided Aries with certain coverages in effect when the RAM XVIII capsized. Six employees of Fluid Crane and one employee of United Fire-all of whom were aboard the RAM XVIII when it capsized-brought personal injury claims against Aries. The motions before the Court present the principal question whether Fieldwood must defend and indemnify Aries and U.S. Specialty from those personal-injury claims. THE TIME CHARTER Section 10 features a waiver-of-subrogation provision mandating that “[u]nderwriters of all policies of insurance required [by Section 10] shall waive their rights of subrogation against the Charterer Group,” which includes Fieldwood. THE POLICY The Policy provides coverage to Aries for protection and indemnity, including coverage for personal-injury liability. The Policy includes a waiver-of-subrogation provision that applies to the protection-and-indemnity coverage. A separate section of the Policy-governing hull-insurance coverage contains a waiver-of-subrogation provision and a provision naming Fieldwood as an additional insured. THE MASTER SERVICES CONTRACTS. Fieldwood executed the Master Services Contracts with Fluid Crane and United Fire, respectively. Fluid Crane and United Fire agreed to indemnify the other entities involved from claims asserted by their own employees, as well as to be responsible for defense costs for such claims. ANALYSIS Fieldwood’s Motion Fieldwood moved the Court to grant partial summary judgment enforcing waivers of subrogation in the Time Charter and Policy and dismissing Aries’s crossclaim and U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention. The Court held that Fieldwood is entitled to partial summary judgment because a review of the Time Charter and the Policy confirms that both Aries and U.S. Specialty have waived their rights of subrogation against Fieldwood. U.S. Specialty Waived Its Rights of Subrogation The Policy unambiguously waives U.S. Specialty’s right of subrogation in favor of Fieldwood. The Policy features a waiver-of-subrogation provision. The Time Charter qualifies as a “written contract” that “require[s]” U.S. Specialty to waive its rights of subrogation against Fieldwood because the Time Charter features a waiver-of-subrogation provision mandating that “[u]nderwriters of all policies of insurance required [by Section 10 of the Time Charter] shall waive their rights of subrogation against the Charterer Group,” which is defined to include Fieldwood. Because a review of the Time Charter and the Policy confirms that U.S. Specialty unambiguously waived its rights of subrogation against Fieldwood, and because the claims asserted in U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention rest on a subrogation theory, the Court granted Fieldwood’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice U.S. Specialty’s complaint-in-intervention. The USDC concluded that the waivers of subrogation in Fieldwood’s favor are enforceable, and Aries and U.S. Specialty have not adequately presented any argument that would allow the Court to hold that their claims for defense and indemnity can survive despite the enforceability of those waivers of subrogation. Fieldwood’s motion for partial summary judgment was GRANTED. ZALMA OPINION Insurance policies like the marine policy interpreted in this case contain standard language authorizing the insured to waive the insurers’ right of subrogation if it does so before there is a loss. Since the litigants sought subrogation recovery which it had waived by the standard language of its policy this five year long litigation was resolved by the acceptance of the waiver. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Occam’s Razor Exclusion for Work Performed by Insured Defeats Claim for Construction Defects Post 4935 Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/gT_NsMHv, see the full video at https://lnkd.in/gqkPHYbp and at https://lnkd.in/gEEXkUe3, and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. The question presented to the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals was whether a contractor’s CGL insurance policy covers general damage to a non-defective part of the contractor’s project resulting from a subcontractor’s defective work on a different part of that project. APPLICATION OF OCCAM’S RAZOR The analysis technique that proposes that the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the more complex. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Applying Massachusetts law, the district court concluded that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci in Admiral Insurance Company, Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Great American Assurance Company v. Tocci Building Corporation, Tocci Residential LLC, John L. Tocci, Sr., No. 22-1462, United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit (November 8, 2024) and Tocci appealed. From 2013 to 2016, Tocci was the construction manager for an apartment project owned by Toll JM EB Residential Urban Renewal LLC (“Toll”). There were several work quality issues and delays on the project, and Toll eventually terminated Tocci in March 2016 for alleged mismanagement of the project. Toll sued with allegations regarding instances of defective work leading to property damage. The allegations included defective work by Tocci’s subcontractors resulting in various instances of property damage to non-defective work on the project, including (1) damage to sheetrock resulting from faulty roof work; (2) mold formation resulting from inadequate sheathing and water getting into the building; and (3) damage to a concrete slab, wood framing, and underground pipes resulting from soil settlement due to improper backfill and soil compaction. DUTY TO DEFEND Tocci sought defense and indemnity coverage under the Admiral insurance policies. Admiral denied coverage. The district court granted Admiral’s motion on duty to defend because the damage alleged in Toll’s complaint did not qualify as “property damage” as defined in the policy because the allegations consisted entirely of damage at Tocci’s own project. ANALYSIS The First Circuit considered three steps to the coverage analysis: (1) Do the damages alleged in the action fall within the scope of coverage?; (2) if so, do the exclusions to coverage apply?; and (3) if so, do any exceptions to the exclusions apply? The First Circuit noted that there is a sharp split of authority on whether damage to non-defective work resulting from a subcontractor’s defective work constitutes “property damage” or is caused by an “occurrence.” The First Circuit decided to avoid the issues of what constitutes “property damage” by focusing on the exclusions which were sufficient to resolve the complete dispute. THE HOLDING There are two “Damage to Property” exclusions that provide that there is no coverage for “property damage” to: that particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations; or that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it. The First Circuit, applying Occam’s Razor, focused its analysis on the exclusion it concluded covers the allegations in the Toll complaint. Since the complaint alleges damage resulting from Tocci’s “incorrectly performed” work on the entire project “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘[Tocci’s] work’ was incorrectly performed on it” refers to the entirety of the project where Tocci was the general contractor charged with supervising and managing the project as a whole. Therefore, the First Circuit concluded that Admiral met its burden of establishing that the Toll action only alleges damage falling within the exclusion and that there was no exception to that exclusion that applied. ZALMA OPINION This is a case of a court applying Occam’s Razor, by picking an easy and obvious solution – the application of an exclusion – and avoiding the problem of different court rulings on coverage about “property damage” and “occurence.” Since the exclusion clearly applied there was no duty to defend. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk Subscribe to my substack at https://lnkd.in/gmmzUVBy

Chiropractor Disciplined for Improper Billing Chiropractor Lies to Board and Loses Right to Practice Post 4930 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chiropractor-disciplined-improper-billing-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-4qjdc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. This appeal arises from an attempt by the state of Illinois to impose discipline upon plaintiff Christopher D. Leone, D.C., due to certain improper activities performed as a licensed chiropractor in the state of Illinois. In Christopher D. Leone, D.C. v. The Department Of Financial And Professional Regulation, Division Of Professional Regulation; and Cecilia Abundis, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Director of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, No. 4-22-0753, 2024 IL App (4th) 220753-U, Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District (November 6, 2024) the Court of Appeal resolved the multiple claims of the chiropractor. BACKGROUND Leone has practiced as a chiropractor since 1999 and initially practiced in the state of Washington. The matter was resolved pursuant to an informal disposition via stipulation. Leone began practicing in Illinois in 2004, and in 2010 and a consent order was issued pursuant to which Leone admitted to the allegations and was reprimanded with a $5000 fine and a requirement that he undertake 20 hours of continuing education; 10 of those hours were to focus on Medicare billing and insurance coding and another 10 on record keeping. In 2013, the United States alleged that Leone “knowingly and fraudulently” submitted Medicare claims of less than $1000 for one-on-one physical therapy services that were not provided. Following negotiation, the parties entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which Leone pleaded guilty to the one-count information and stipulated to a factual basis for his plea. Shortly after the Medicare fraud charge was filed against Leone, the State filed a five-count complaint alleging multiple violations of the Medical Practices Act of 1987 (Act). During the litigation, Leone applied to renew his chiropractic license. One of the questions on the application asked whether he had been convicted of any criminal offense, state or federal, since July 2011; Leone answered, “No,” failing to document the Medicare fraud conviction. Attempting to explain his federal guilty plea, Leone said that he was unable to modify the language in the plea agreement, as “the time for negotiations had run out” and the plea was a “take-it-or-leave-it” proposition. Leone read the plea agreement line by line and, although he claimed it contained false information, he signed it. ALJ Report and Recommendation The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued his report and recommendation, finding that, pursuant to the guilty plea in the federal case, Leone had admitted that his patients performed physical therapy on their own without supervision. Also, Leone admitted in his plea that entries in patient records indicating that they received hands-on or one-on-one physical therapy were false. Further, the guilty plea established that Leone knowingly submitted claims to Medicare for services that he did not provide. Leone had also billed private insurers numerous times under the same code as Medicare. The conviction also established that he engaged in false billing and false entries in patient records. The ALJ recommended an indefinite suspension of Leone’s license for a minimum of two years. An expert testified that chiropractors who engaged in Medicare fraud violated several tenets of chiropractic ethics. There was a pattern of overcharging for services that were not provided, false notations in patient records to support the false charges, and the submission of false claims to insurance that went on for at least five years. Leone obtained fees by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and those actions fell below the professional and ethical standards required of chiropractors in Illinois. Leone’s conduct, along with his past disciplinary history, “demonstrate[d] a pattern of behavior that [was] not acceptable.” ANALYSIS It was undisputed that Leone submitted charges under billing code 97110. Leone pled guilty to submitting a false demand for payment upon the United States. In his plea, Leone admitted to billing for services that were not actually provided to his patients as claimed, “and the instruments containing the demands for payment of public money, therefore were false when they were submitted” and “were submitted to Medicare with the knowledge that he did not perform the service charged.” The guilty plea supports the conclusion that Leone knowingly and intentionally submitted claims for reimbursement for services provided under code 97110 where the services did not meet the requirements to be paid under that code. This pattern went on for approximately five years, resulting in 1324 false claims in the amount of $93,900. The Department established a violation of the Act where Leone failed to note the federal conviction on his renewal application. Discipline A review of the initial circuit court order in this matter reveals that it merely recommended that the Department consider probation as a punishment; it did not make a ruling to that effect. There was no abuse of discretion in the discipline imposed. For the reasons stated, the Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and affirm the Director’s decision. ZALMA OPINION Leone successfully committed fraud on the United States, the state of Illinois, and the insurance industry by falsely billing services he did not provide. He pleaded guilty to one count of Federal Health Insurance fraud and then lied to the state of Illinois when he applied to renew his license. With lawyers and retained experts he delayed the sanction for years. The Court of Appeals finally resolved the multiple disputes and applied an appropriate sanction and suspension of his license. He should consider himself lucky that he was not prosecuted criminally by the state and the US Government accepted his plea. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Permanent Punishment for Conviction for One Ounce of Cocaine Improper Government Overreach and Abuse Reversed Post 4927 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/permanent-punishment-conviction-one-ounce-cocaine-zalma-esq-cfe-geq1c, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. After Recovery From Cocaine Abuse Dr. Regained License to Practice CMS Refused to Allow Dr. White to Bill Medicare for Services Dr. Stephen White challenged two unfavorable decisions made by the Secretary for the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) that denied and revoked his Medicare enrollment. The decisions, rendered by the Appellate Division of the Departmental Appeals Board (“Board”), were based on Dr. White’s 2010 guilty plea and deferred prosecution for possession of less than 1 gram of cocaine, which occurred in Texas in 2007. In Stephen White, M.D. v. Xavier Becerra, Secretary for the United States Department of Health and Human Services, No. 2:19-CV-00037-SAB, United States District Court, E.D. Washington (October 28, 2024) the USDC applied entered a judgment reversing the decision of the Secretary [42 U.S.C. § 405(g).] SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. BACKGROUND Dr. White is an orthopedic surgeon. In 2006 and 2007, he was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine in Texas. He was able to rehab and become clean of his problem with the drug. The Texas Medical Board revoked his license, but then monitored his recovery and compliance and allowed him to practice again. Dr. White had no violations for nine years following his arrest. He is currently practicing medicine in Washington state and is an enrolled Medicare supplier. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sustained the denial, finding that CMS had a legitimate basis because Dr. White was convicted of a felony offense. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Dr. White appealed that decision to the USDC. OVERVIEW OF MEDICARE PROGRAM The Medicare program provides health insurance benefits to people sixty-five years old or older and to eligible disabled persons. Suppliers, such as Dr. White, must be enrolled in the Medicare program and be granted billing privileges to be eligible to receive payment for care and services rendered to a Medicare-eligible beneficiary. DENIALS CMS may deny a supplier’s enrollment for any reason stated in federal statutes that allow that CMS may deny a provider’s or supplier’s enrollment in the Medicare program for the some of the following reasons: Felonies such as insurance fraud and similar crimes. REVOCATIONS The ALJ found CMS had a legitimate basis because White was convicted of a felony offense that CMS determined to be detrimental to the bests interest of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries. Dr. White’s presented equitable arguments to the ALJ that 1 he self-reported and was not practicing; 2 using his self-report to deny would encourage other physicians to not self-report, 3 he has fully complied with the terms of the modified license, and eventually he was allowed to practice medicine without limitations. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision, upholding CMS’ denial of Dr. White’s Medicare enrollment and rejected Dr. White’s argument that the timing of the revocation action by CMS was clearly retaliatory and intended to apply pressure on Dr. White for additional monetary penalties. ANALYSIS The USDC found CMS’ decisions to deny Dr. White enrollment in Medicare and revoke his privileges, and the subsequent Board’s affirmations were arbitrary and capricious and not supported substantial evidence. CMS did not have a legitimate reason to deny enrollment or revoke because the record does not support CMS’ assertions that Dr. White’s 2010 conviction for simple possession of a small amount of cocaine was detrimental to the best interest of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries. The USDC understood the deference it owed to administrative agencies as they adjudicate numerous complex cases before them. Yet, a court may not simply act as a rubber stamp for agency decisions. Because CMS failed to provide a reasonable basis for denying Dr. White his enrollment in Medicare or revoking his Medicare privileges, the decision of the Secretary is reversed. ZALMA OPINION A doctor should never get involved or addicted to illegal substances like Cocaine. The Fact that a doctor self reports his involvement with the drug, was rehabilitated, clean for nine years, and practices medicine legally, does not pose a danger to Medicare as do those doctors who are arrested every year for fraud. The decision of Becerra, the ALJ and the Board was clearly retaliatory and abusive and the USDC had no choice but to reverse the Board and let the doctor continue to practice medicine and charge Medicare for his services. Overreach by the administrative agency was stopped by the court. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

**Video Link Below** :point_down: **The Globalist Elite must start running we are going to Abolish the Rothschild(London Globalist Elite) Federal RESERVE through Elon Musk and Former Senator Ron Paul. Who started the End the Fed Movement.. And Robert F Kennedy Jr is going to Gut the FDA for allowing poison in our foods that are banned in the UK. **CRITICAL POST ELECTION ANALYSIS: Trump’s Victory Is Only A Populist Beachhead — Now We Must Win The War Against The Globalists**. **Electing Trump was only the first step -- now we must politically ATTACK the New World Order and keep the system in defense mode!** **DIRECT LINK  :link: TO VIDEO** :point_right:https://x.com/RealAlexJones/status/1854234057682337911 **Alex Jones lays out how electing Donald Trump has president for a second term is only the first step in this battle against the globalists, as they’ll surely try to strike back when he assumes office. Tune in to learn what comes next and how to keep the momentum going in our favor!** by Infowars.comNovember 6th, 2024 3:35 PM https://www.infowars.com/posts/critical-post-election-analysis-trumps-victory-is-only-a-populist-beachhead-now-we-must-win-the-war-against-the-globalists

LIVE ELECTION COVERAGE 2024: Blaze Media’s Exclusive Analysis & Results https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQXmGCEimnA

GOOD MORNING FRIENDS AND FOLLOWERS: ONCE AGAIN I USE X22 REPORT AS A GREAT SOURCE AND ANALYSIS OF WHAT COULD HAPPEN DURING ELECTIONS AND AFTER ELECTIONS.

Officer Caught Aiding Criminals for Cash Police Officer who took Bribes from Insurance Fraudster Convicted Post 4923 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/officer-caught-aiding-criminals-cash-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-niboc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. Demarkco Johnson (“Johnson”), appealed his convictions and claims the following errors: 1 The trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s request for a jury instruction on entrapment. 2 The trial court erred in failing to admonish and/or instruct the witness to stop answering questions with a legal conclusion after defense counsel had objected. 3 Appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence; therefore, his convictions are in violation of the Ohio state constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In State Of Ohio v. Demarkco Johnson, 2024-Ohio-5098, No. 113591, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga (October 24, 2024) resolved the issues on appeal. FACTS Defendants were charged with two counts of conspiracy, three counts of bribery, eight counts of forgery, one count of insurance fraud, one count of identity fraud, and one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. They engaged in a pattern of corrupt activity charge included a clause alleging that at least one of the incidents of corrupt activity was a felony of the third degree or higher. At trial George Michael Riley, Sr. (“Riley”), testified that he became a confidential source for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), which was investigating corruption in the East Cleveland Police Department. Special Agent Shaun Roth (“Roth”), an agent with the FBI working with the Cleveland Metropolitan Anti-Corruption Task Force, testified that the FBI executed a search warrant for one of Riley’s properties. Harris’s services included running Riley’s name in police databases to check for warrants and blocking off city roads so Riley could move his demolition equipment throughout the city. Two of Riley’s trucks were stolen from his business in East Cleveland. Riley told his contacts at the FBI, and FBI officials instructed him to file a police report with the East Cleveland police just as any other victim would do. Riley cooperated with the FBI. After hearing the evidence, the jury found Johnson guilty of two counts of bribery, as alleged in Counts 5 and 10 of the indictment. The jury acquitted him of all other charges. The court sentenced Johnson to 12 months in prison on both counts and ordered that the two prison terms be served concurrently. Johnson appealed the trial court’s judgment. Law and Analysis - Entrapment Instruction In the first assignment of error, Johnson argues the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. Entrapment is a ‘confession and avoidance’ defense in which the defendant admits committing the acts charged but claims that the criminal design arose with the state’s agent. There is no entrapment when government officials merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense to a criminal defendant who was predisposed to commit the offense. The video evidence showed Johnson handing Riley reports in exchange for money on multiple occasions. Johnson’s conduct demonstrated a ready acquiescence to the inducements offered by the government’s confidential source and a willingness to become involved in criminal activity in exchange for money. The evidence showed that Johnson not only had expert knowledge as to how to create the police reports in a way that could go undetected, but he also had access to the blank police forms that made the concealment of the reports possible. The Court of Appeals found that evidence did not support an entrapment defense. Testimony Pertaining to Bribery In the second assignment of error, Johnson argues the trial court erred by refusing to instruct Roth to refrain from using the word “bribe” or “bribery payment” in response to questions that were not specifically related to bribe payments. Even if Roth had avoided the words “bribe” or “bribery payment,” the outcome of the trial would not have been any different. The overwhelming evidence established that Johnson helped create fake police reports in exchange for money. Manifest Weight of the Evidence Johnson argued his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court of Appeals noted that Johnson’s convictions were not dependent on his knowledge of any insurance scheme or Harris’s separate dealings with Riley. His convictions were based solely on his position as a police officer in the East Cleveland Police Department and his acceptance of cash in exchange for police reports. Video evidence showed Johnson accepting cash from Riley in exchange for the reports on at least two occasions. And, despite Johnson’s argument to the contrary, Johnson played along when Harris introduced him to Riley as Nevels. CONCLUSION The Court of Appeals ordered that a special mandate issue out of the court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. ZALMA OPINION There can be no excuse for a police officer to sell information to an insurance criminal to ease the ability of the crime to succeed. Officer Johnson tried multiple arguments to set aside his conviction even though the evidence against him was overwhelming. The Court of Appeals disposed of his arguments quickly and intelligently. Fraud is a crime. Insurance fraud is a crime. Helping the criminal avoid prosecution is also a crime and establishes the officer had given up his honor for cash. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Who’s on First & in What Percentage Application of Diverse “Other Insurance” Clauses Insurers Protected Insured and Litigated Their Differences Post 4920 Two insurance companies- Gemini and Zurich- asked the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal to determine what share of a $2 million settlement each is required to pay. The district court entered judgment for Gemini, ordering that Zurich pay $500,000 plus prejudgment interest. Both parties appealed, with Gemini seeking another $500,000 and Zurich challenging the award of prejudgment interest. In Gemini Insurance Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company, No. 22-13495, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (October 23, 2024) the competing “other insurance clauses” were resolved. FACTS After the death of Josue Vallejo, who was struck by a tractor-trailer operated by an employee of FSR Trucking, Inc two of three insurers disputed what proportion of the settlement each should pay. Zurich insured FSR, through its coverage of Commercial, for $1 million. Gemini also insured FSR for $3 million. The Vallejo claim settled for $3 million, of which Gemini contributed $2 million. Ryder’s insurance company, which is not a party to this appeal, contributed the other $1 million. Gemini and Zurich agree that they each owe a share of the $2 million, but dispute how much each one must pay. Under Gemini’s theory, they each owe $1 million. Under Zurich’s theory, they each owe their pro rata share, which is $500,000 for Zurich and $1.5 million for Gemini. The different theories of coverage turn on the application of the two policies’ “other insurance” clauses, which generally function to apportion coverage when there is overlapping insurance. Gemini argues that its policy is excess to Zurich’s, while Zurich argues that the policies attach at the same level and thus trigger pro rata contribution. Gemini sued Zurich for a declaratory judgment in its favor and an award of $1 million plus interest under claims of contractual subrogation or equitable subrogation/contribution. Zurich tendered $500,000 to Gemini to satisfy its pro rata share. Gemini, however, continued to litigate for the other $500,000 plus interest on the entire amount. Gemini appealed the District Court’s ruling in favor of Zurich and sought to obtain the other $500,000. ANALYSIS In Florida, where more than one insurer’s policy provides coverage for a loss, as the parties agree is the case here, it is appropriate to review the insurance contracts to see if the documents address the ‘ranking’ or contribution of other insurers. The Other Insurance Clauses Gemini’s “other insurance” clause provides: “This insurance is excess over and shall not contribute with any of the other insurance, whether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis. This condition will not apply to insurance specifically written as excess over this policy.” Zurich’s “other insurance” clause is slightly different. “When this Coverage Form and any other Coverage Form or policy covers on the same basis, either excess or primary, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that the Limit of Insurance of our Coverage Form bears to the total of the limits of all the Coverage Forms and policies covering on the same basis. Interpretation of the “Other Insurance” Clauses Where two insurance policies contain excess insurance clauses the clauses are deemed mutually repugnant and both insurers become primary and share the loss on a pro rata basis in accordance with their policy limits. Zurich argued, and the district court agreed, that both policies contain excess clauses such as pro rata contribution results. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals sided with Gemini because when two policies containing conflicting “other insurance” or excess [uninsured/underinsured motorist] clauses. In sum an “other insurance” clause containing the phrase “we will pay the proportion of damages payable as excess” means that the clause was pro rata, even though it also characterized itself as an excess clause. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit concluded both policies were primary. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s resolution of the cross-motions for summary judgment with regard to the amount of contribution and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Gemini for the principal amount of $1,000,000, with the understanding that Zurich has already paid half of that sum. Upon entry of the amended final judgment on remand, Gemini will be the prevailing party. When a verdict liquidates damages on a plaintiff’s out-of-pocket, pecuniary losses, plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of that loss. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s resolution of the cross-motions for summary judgment and remanded for the court to enter judgment in favor of Gemini in the principal amount of $1,000,000 understanding that Zurich has already paid $500,000. It also affirmed the award of prejudgment interest on the first $500,000 and direct the court to award Gemini prejudgment interest on the second $500,000 from February 7, 2019, until the date of the amended final judgment. ZALMA OPINION The three insurers of the defendant did the right thing by protecting the insured and then resolving their dispute over the share owed in court. Although insurance companies, generally, should not sue each other. “Other Insurance” clauses invariably raise disputes between insurers and often cause hardship to the insured. In this case Gemini, Zurich and an unnamed insurer put up the $3 million to settle and then Gemini and Zurich sued to clarify who owed what. The Eleventh Circuit found that the District Court was wrong because interpreting the competing “other insurance” clauses should have resulted in a finding that both Gemini and Zurich were primary insurers and each owed $1 million of the settlement and Zurich owed Gemini $500,000 plus interest. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. 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