Intent to Move is not a Residence Residence Premises Requires the Insured to Live in Residence Post 4944 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/intent-move-residence-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-qmlxc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. In Paul Villalobos v. Clear Blue Insurance Company, No. 24-20125, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (December 10, 2024) the the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissa of Plaintiff-Appellant Paul Villalobos’s breach of contract claim following a coverage dispute between himself and his insurer, Clear Blue Insurance Company, because he admitted he did not live in the insured premises. FACTS Villalobos is named on a Clear Blue homeowners’ policy, which provides coverage for property located at 7503 Muirwood Lane in Houston, Texas (the “Property”). The policy’s “Property Coverages” section states in pertinent part: “We cover . . . [t]he dwelling on the ‘residence premises’ shown in the Declarations.” The policy defines “residence premises,” also in pertinent part, as “[t]he one-family dwelling where you reside . . . on the inception date of the policy period shown in the Declarations.” The Declarations page lists Villalobos as the insured, his mailing address as the Property, and the inception date as September 21, 2021. In mid-November 2021, Villalobos reported to Clear Blue that wind and hail had damaged the Property’s roof earlier that month. Clear Blue denied coverage after Villalobos admitted he lived in Colorado and had never resided at the Property. Villalobos sued Clear Blue, alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas Insurance Code, fraud, and ongoing conspiracy to commit illegal acts. ANALYSIS During his deposition, Villalobos testified that he lived in Colorado for over nine years and did not reside at the Property when the Clear Blue policy went into effect. Clear Blue moved for summary judgment on Villalobos’s claims, arguing there was no insurance coverage for Villalobos’s property damage as a matter of law. Applying Louisiana law, the Fifth Circuit has previously determined that an identical residence requirement in a homeowners’ insurance policy required “more than purchasing a home or intending to move into it.” GeoVera Specialty Ins. Co. v. Joachin, 964 F.3d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 2020). Applying Joachin the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Property did not satisfy the policy’s residence requirement and was not a covered “residence premises” because: it is undisputed that Villalobos did not reside on the Property on the inception date of the Clear Blue policy; and Villalobos’s only material argument on appeal is that he intended to move onto the Property. Joachin held that “intending to move” is not enough. The Fifth Circuit concluded that there is no coverage under the policy. Accordingly, Villalobos’s breach of contract claim failed and the USDC’s judgment was affirmed. ZALMA OPINION That something as obvious as a home in Texas cannot be the residence premises of a person who lives full time in Colorado. Insurers issue property insurance policies providing coverage similar to a homeowners policy to the owner of a rental property while a homeowners policy limits coverage to the person who actually resides at the property. That this case went to the Fifth Circuit was the waste of Plaintiff’s time and money, the waste of the time of the trial court, and the waste of the time of the Fifth Circuit who rendered a concise and clear opinion. A less kind judge or appellate court would have imposed sanctions on the party plaintiff and his counsel. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Trial Must Proceed Under Plaintiff’s True Name Fraud Defense Insufficient to Allow Plaintiff to Sue Under Pseudonym Post 4944 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trial-must-proceed-under-plaintiffs-true-name-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-zc7ic/, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. LITIGANTS MUST NOT HIDE THEIR IDENTITY Plaintiff sued State Farm under a pseudonym. The Court subsequently issued an order requiring Plaintiff to proceed using his actual name. Plaintiff appealed that order, and he now seeks to stay the Court’s order while his appeal is pending in James Doe v. State Farm General Insurance Company, No. 23-cv-04734-JSC, United States District Court, N.D. California (November 26, 2024). BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleged State Farm improperly and in bad faith denied coverage for his claim involving a lost wristwatch that retails at approximately $30,300. He filed his complaint under the pseudonym “James Doe,” insisting a pseudonym was necessary “to protect his privacy, his family, his reputation, and his livelihood, because he has been struggling with mental illnesses.” The Court rescinded its order permitting Plaintiff to proceed anonymously. At a ZOOM hearing the Court informed Plaintiff his actual name appeared on the Zoom screen. Although Plaintiff had yet to file a motion to stay the Court’s order requiring him to proceed under his actual name. The Court denied State Farm’s motion as to the breach of contract and wrongful policy cancellation claims. Jury trial is scheduled to commence in May 2025. DISCUSSION Parties may use pseudonyms in the unusual case when nondisclosure of the party’s identity is necessary to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment. Plaintiff based his claim for anonymity on two grounds: 1. Plaintiff argues anonymity is necessary because he has revealed highly sensitive and personal matters about himself, his mental illnesses and physical injuries in the course of the case. Yet, Plaintiff did not identify where in the record those highly sensitive matters are discussed. Plaintiff has not sought to redact any portions of his filings, assuming anything in them may be concealed from the public. So, Plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on this theory. 2. Plaintiff argues anonymity is necessary because the accusation of insurance fraud will ruin his reputation for honesty before a jury has passed judgment on his credibility and honesty at trial. Plaintiff states the case involves grave social stigmatization to Plaintiff because he has been accused of committing or seeking to commit insurance fraud. The USDC noted that Plaintiff showed no reasonable probability that an insurer’s material misrepresentation defense transforms a breach of contract claim into a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature, Here, Plaintiff is seeking coverage for a lost wristwatch. If an accusation of insurance fraud were sufficiently stigmatizing to warrant anonymity, then plaintiffs could proceed anonymously virtually anytime they challenge an insurer’s denial of coverage on the basis of a material misrepresentation. The Ninth Circuit’s mandate requires that parties only use pseudonyms in the unusual case. IRREPARABLE INJURY Plaintiff failed to demonstrate he will be irreparably injured absent a stay. The injury Plaintiff fears has already occurred to some extent by Plaintiff’s own doing. He appeared at a public hearing using his actual name. Further, in its recent summary judgment order, the Court concluded there was a dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiff intentionally concealed or misrepresented a material fact or circumstance relating to his insurance. At this point in this proceeding, there has been no finding of insurance fraud. HOIST ON HIS OWN PETARD Given that Plaintiff himself proceeded at a public hearing without taking steps to prevent the very disclosure he claims is so injurious, Plaintiff has not met his burden on the irreparable injury factor. As summary judgment was denied on the breach of contract claim, the case is proceeding to trial. The public interest lies in transparent and public court proceedings, especially trials. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to stay the order requiring Plaintiff to proceed under his actual name. ZALMA OPINION Pursuing litigation under a pseudonym because the defendant insurer claimed the Plaintiff attempted insurance fraud because his mental health and reputation would be harmed by the claims is insufficient. First, Plaintiff chose to sue State Farm. He could protect his mental health and reputation by not suing. Second, he was willing to attend a Zoom hearing with his true name showing, thereby effectively waiving the claim of anonymity. It could easily be concluded that he has sued under a pseudonym because he was embarrassed he was caught. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Luigi Mangione's Shady Connections With Nancy Pelosi Luigi Mangione, the 26-year-old arrested for allegedly shooting the CEO of United Healthcare in the back outside a New York hotel, reportedly stopped responding to friends and family over the last several months. 'It had to be done': Luigi Mangione left 'disturbing' message in manifesto. Nancy Pelosi and her brother, Thomas D'Alesandro III, are connected to Luigi Mangione, the murder suspect in the death of United Healthcare CEO Brian Thompson, through his grandfather, Nicholas Mangione. In a 1989 Washington Post article, D'Alesandro, the former mayor of Baltimore, defended grandfather Nicholas Mangione's reputation, calling him "big hearted" despite investigations into human rights violations and regulatory shortcuts tied to his business practices. The plot thickens because Nancy Pelosi made a suspicious stock trade the same day United Healthcare had a cyber attack, and the company she traded in was chosen to investigate the breach. More information BELOW THE VIDEO on Rumble. https://rumble.com/v5y5kmt-luigi-mangiones-shady-connections-with-nancy-pelosi.html

The Best Rookies in Madden NFL 25 Explained That said, amid the four abundant captains, who is the best? Who can accompany accumulated to the Madden Ultimate Team? Aggregation captains comedy a absolute important role in a team, as they can achieve or breach a team’s all-embracing performance. As such, players allegation to be authentic aback acrimonious one. They should accede aspects such as the team’s chemistry, scheme, and position. For instance, if the aggregation runs a breadth defense, the best bet would be to accept cornerback or assurance MUT captain. On the added hand, if the aggregation runs a man-on-man aegis blazon of game, the best advantage would be a band breaker or cornerback aggregation captain. Therefore, afore clearing on a captain, accede how the amateur will alloy in and activity value. 4 Kevin Mawae Kevin Mawae is not a drifter to the NFL world. Actually, the Pro Football Hall of Famer is at the centermost of NFL history. The aloft Tennesse Titans and New York Jets lineman played for three assorted teams in his 16-year career in the NFL.His MUT captain agenda ante able-bodied in aspects such as advance block, appulse block, canyon block, run block, awareness, and strength. And that’s not all; the NFL fable can additionally alleviate accessible abilities like Defended Protector, Nasty Streak, and Identifier. He can be a appalling ballast for the breach by creating lanes for the alive aback while absorption the quarterback. The aloft NFL Players Association admiral is additionally accomplished at run blocking and intercepting passes, which makes him a admired accession to any team. He can achieve adjustments in the aegis if bare to advance the bold or move from his position to block downfield. Nonetheless, the 7x Pro Bowler is not absolute alive or fast compared to added centers. He struggles a bit adjoin added alive and faster opponents. Be as it may, Mawae is not abandoned one of the best centers in the game, but he can additionally be a solid accession to any Madden Ultimate team. He has abundant administration abilities and will absolutely accession the abhorrent line. Gamers can advance their all-embracing appraisement to 85 application 5 Aggregation Captain Advance Tokens. 3 Eric Berry Eric Berry ranks absolute abominable in MUT 25 with adapted ratings in tackling, breadth coverage, hit power, comedy recognition, agility, and awareness. The aloft Kansas City Chiefs amateur is a adjustable and adjustable apostle who can actualize plays and affairs from about anywhere on the field. The 2013 NFL Arresting Amateur of the Year is additionally able to alleviate accessible actualization like Universal Coverage, Enforcer, and Acrobat. Similarly, players who adorned arresting formations and schemes will accretion him absolute handy. He is adjustable and can acclimate to comedy as a box safety, a band back, a aperture corner, and a bottomless safety. The abundant brawl militarist can apprenticed end or awning receivers in a breadth or man coverage. And that’s not all about the MUT captain. The 5x Pro Bowler can additionally force turnovers, acknowledgment to his brawl abilities and hit power. As always, MMOexp.com offers you a safe and cheap Madden 25 Coins service.

Appear for a Scheduled EUO or Lose Failure to Honor Conditions Precedent Voids Coverage in New York Post 4937 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/appear-scheduled-euo-lose-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-gvkec/, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. State Farm contended that it is entitled to summary judgment because of the failure to appear for examination under oath (EUO) by multiple defendants. State Farm contended that timely notices were properly mailed to the Claimants who failed to appear. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Alford A. Smith, M.D., et al, 2024 NY Slip Op 33802(U), Index No. 155607/2020, Motion Seq. No. 003, Supreme Court, New York County, Appellate Division (October 24, 2024) court ruled in favor of State Farm. The Supreme Court of New York County ORDERED that the plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm/Plaintiff’), motion for summary judgment was GRANTED against defendants, Alford A. Smith, M.D., P.C., and the multiple other defendants who are doctors, chiropractors and other health services, (hereinafter collectively (“The Defendants”). FACTS The Supreme Court found that the EUO scheduling letters were timely requested and claimants failed to appear at that EUO. The documentary evidence showed that plaintiff sent the EUO scheduling letters to the claimants within 15 business days of receiving the prescribed verification forms as required by New York statute. FRAUD, FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR EUO & FAILURE TO SIGN TRANSCRIPT ARE BREACHES OF MATERIAL CONDITION PRECEDENT The Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court’s ruling that the failure to appear for an EUO that was requested in a timely fashion by the insurer is a breach of a condition precedent to coverage and voids the policy ab initio. In addition, although claimant Griselda Torres unlike the other defendants, appeared for her EUO, Torres failed to return a subscribed copy of her EUO transcript. State Farm properly and effectively argued that appearing for and testifying at EUO and returning the transcripts of the EUO are conditions precedent to coverage and failure to sign and return the transcript warranted a denial of the claims. State Farm demonstrated in its motion and supporting evidence that multiple claimants breached a condition precedent to coverage by failing to appear for properly noticed EUOs on two separate occasions. Furthermore, claimant Griselda Torres’ failure to subscribe and return the transcript of her EUOsviolated a condition precedent to coverage and warranted denial of the claims. Moreover, there was nothing on the Court’s record to suggest that the scheduled EUOs were not justified, nor held at a place and time that was not reasonably convenient to the defendants. CONCLUSION State Farm’s motion seeking summary judgment in its favor was GRANTED as to THE multiple defendants and it was further ORDERED that any requested relief sought not expressly addressed herein has nonetheless been considered; and it was further ORDERED that the case shall continue against the remaining defendants; and it was further ORDERED that within 30 days of entry, plaintiff shall serve a copy of this decision/order upon the defendants with notice of entry. ZALMA OPINION The defendants in this case were doctors, physicians, chiropractors and other health care providers who billed State Farm for services provided to people who were injured in automobile accidents and assigned their rights to the providers who tried to collect their billings without complying with the EUO condition. They all lost their claims because they refused to appear except one defendant who appeared but failed to sign the transcript of the EUO and return it to State Farm. They all lost their claims and State Farm will continue its actions against many more defendants not subject to the motion. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

EUO is a Material Condition Precedent Claim Properly Denied for Refusal to Testify at EUO Post 4936 Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/euo-material-condition-precedent-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-exccc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. See the full video at and at Erin Hughes appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) on her causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith arising after Farmers’ denial of Hughes’s property insurance claim because she refused to testify at a second examination under oath (EUO). In Erin Hughes v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, B331168, California Court of Appeals (November 8, 2024) the condition precedent was enforced. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Hughes is the owner of real property in Malibu (the property). In December 2020, Hughes obtained an insurance policy to cover the property for fire loss through the California FAIR Plan Association (FAIR Plan). Also in December 2020, Hughes obtained a homeowner’s insurance policy from Farmers to cover perils other than fire, including losses due to theft (the policy). One month later, in January 2021, the property sustained significant fire damage. Hughes contacted Farmers, which advised her that fire loss was not covered by her Farmers policy, and she would have to pursue any such claim through her FAIR Plan policy. Unhappy, on January 21, 2021, Hughes tendered a theft claim under the Farmers policy, asserting in excess of $2 million worth of personal property was stolen from the property. Farmers ultimately denied the claim on January 5, 2022, on the ground that Hughes failed to cooperate with Farmers’ investigation, including by failing to participate in a second examination under oath as required by the policy. Hughes’s Complaint Against Farmers One week after the denial of her claim, Hughes sued Farmers and alleged Farmers demanded “duplicative, onerous and/or unnecessary” documentation of stolen items. Further, she alleged Farmers subjected her to “two confrontational, accusatory and grueling examinations under oath.” Hughes alleged her second examination under oath had been “suspended due to [her] medical condition,” but Farmers disregarded her condition and demanded a third examination. Farmers’ Motion for Summary Judgment Farmers moved for summary judgment contending it properly denied Hughes’s theft claim based on her failure to cooperate with Farmers’ investigation of her claim as well as her material misrepresentations in obtaining the Farmers policy. In May 2021, as part of Farmers’ theft claim investigation, Hughes participated in an examination under oath. During the examination, Hughes’s counsel informed the Farmers attorney he had just sent more than 40 additional receipts that the attorney would be receiving shortly. Recognizing they would not have time to go through the new items that day and the examination would need to continue on a future date, the Farmers attorney proposed “continu[ing] to work with one another to identify what’s missing.” In response, Hughes and her counsel agreed, with Hughes stating she would be happy to get “every single thing that you need and I’ll send it to my attorney right away.” In October 2021, a second session of the examination under oath was held regarding documentation Hughes had produced during and after the first session. Hughes appeared remotely with counsel and before any questions were asked of her, she objected to a further examination. Hughes accused the Farmers attorney of interrogating her “like a fucking criminal” and stated, “if you want to take my deposition . . . you are going to take a second deposition in court, and that’s going to be a formal deposition.” Hughes’s remote connection then cut out, and her counsel indicated she would not proceed with the examination. Farmers informed Hughes that it was denying coverage based on her failure to cooperate with Farmers’ investigation and particularly her refusal to proceed with the second examination under oath. Trial Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment and Denial of Hughes’s Continuance Request and Motion for New Trial The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers. Noting an insurer has “an absolute right” to require the insured to submit to an examination under oath “as long as the insurer exercises the right reasonably,” the court determined Hughes had not shown Farmers acted unreasonably. The court concluded summary judgment was appropriate “based solely on failure to cooperate.” DISCUSSION The trial court properly concluded there was no genuine dispute that Hughes’s failure to participate in an examination under oath constituted a material breach of the policy; accordingly, Farmers was excused from having to pay on Hughes’s claim. The right to require the insured to submit to an examination under oath concerning all proper subjects of inquiry is reasonable as a matter of law. An insured’s compliance with a policy requirement to submit to an examination under oath is a prerequisite to the right to receive benefits under the policy. Because Hughes refused to cooperate with Farmers’ investigation by participating in and completing her examination under oath, she cannot establish her own performance under the policy. Breach of Implied Covenant Claim The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based on general contract law and the long-standing rule that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. Hughes’s claim for bad faith fails as a matter of law. ZALMA OPINION Wildfires tend to destroy everything. That is why insurers are unwilling to write fire insurance in Malibu and other areas prone to wildfires and obtain fire insurance from the Fair Plan, an organization designed to cover uninsurable risks. Because of the destruction done by a wildfire or a dwelling fire a $2 million dollar theft loss after a fire is questionable and a good reason to take a thorough EUO. Farmers tried to do so and Hughes refused without reason after admitting she left open much investigation elements at the agreed conclusion of the first session and an agreement to a second only to refuse. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg

https://medforth.biz/uk-migrant-allowed-to-stay-in-uk-despite-sexually-assaulting-relatives-as-deportation-would-breach-right-to-family-life/

Bad Faith Set Up Fails Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bad-faith-set-up-fails-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-jllxc, see the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. Inadequate Information Made Refusal to Pay Policy Limits Not Bad Faith INADEQUATE MEDICAL AUTHORIZATION USED TO CAUSE INSURER TO REFUSE SETTLEMENT DEMAND Post 4930 Kara Flick appealed from the judgment after a jury rejected her claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Flick contends the judgment should be reversed due to juror misconduct. In KARA FLICK v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, B330507, California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division (November 5, 2024) the Court of Appeals resolved the dispute. FACTUAL HISTORY After sustaining injuries in an automobile accident caused by Francisco Reyes, Jr., Flick had her attorney send Reyes's insurer, the United Services Automobile Association (USAA), a letter explaining the severity of her injuries and an authorization for the release of her medical records. Flick's attorney followed up with a settlement demand two months later, requesting that USAA pay Flick the entirety of Reyes's $100,000 policy limit in exchange for a release of liability. Attached to the demand was a single medical record from Flick's neurologist. USAA investigated Flick's claim and determined it did not have sufficient information to accept or reject her demand. Flick then filed a personal injury lawsuit against Reyes. The jury found in her favor and awarded nearly $1.7 million in damages. Flick, with an assignment from the Reyes, sued USAA for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. TRIAL At trial, a USAA claims adjustor admitted that Reyes was fully at fault for the accident with Flick. Reyes could therefore be exposed to liability in excess of his policy limits-if Flick provided sufficient documentation to support her claim. USAA's expert on insurance claims handling and another of its claims service managers both agreed with the supervisor that Flick's authorization was invalid and inadequate to allow USAA to obtain Flick's medical records. USAA needed additional records before it could determine the value of Flick's claim. Those records could have included the medical bills Flick provided to her own insurance company, the multiple doctor's notes she had excusing her from work, or the thumb drive recording her purported speech problems, all of which were entered into evidence at her personal injury trial. Because they were not provided to USAA, it was "very difficult to place a value on" Flick's claim. Flick's expert testified that USAA's handling of the settlement demand "was clearly unreasonable." Flick also did not respond to USAA's requests for additional information. By a vote of nine to three, the jury found that Flick did not make a reasonable settlement demand of USAA and rejected her claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court polled the jury, and each juror confirmed their vote. DISCUSSION The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Flick's new trial motion. USAA successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice by showing there is no reasonable probability that the juror, D.C.'s misconduct by not explaining he did not hear all of the adjuster's testimony, actually harmed Flick. Much of the adjustor's testimony consisted of facts regarding his communications with Flick's attorney - facts that were undisputed. What was disputed-whether Flick's settlement demand was reasonable-was the subject of other witness testimony, including USAA's expert on insurance claims handling, its supervising claims service manager, Flick's personal injury attorney, and her expert witness on insurance claims handling. What the admitted evidence showed was that D.C. confirmed multiple times that he voted that Flick did not make a reasonable settlement demand: Based on this record there was no reasonable probability that D.C.'s alleged juror misconduct actually harmed Flick. ZALMA OPINION The tort of bad faith arose from abuse by insurers on those they insured. Since its adoption in California about three quarters of a century ago, the abuse has been turned on to insurers. Ms. Flick's counsel placed a demand for settlement on USAA that it could not reasonably and in good faith to its insured, Reyes, because it was incomplete and inadequately supported and forced Flick and Reyes go through a trial where she received an uncollectible judgment against Reyes in hopes of a gigantic bad faith judgment. After much litigation and USAA spending a great deal to defend itself she received the $100,000 policy limit. USAA was punished but neither Flick nor her lawyers profited from the scheme or the appeal. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

No Breach of Contract no Bad Faith Happy Veterans Day to My Fellow Veterans Some Claims Proper Some Not Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/happy-veterans-day-my-fellow-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-ovpec, shttps://www.linkedin.com/pulse/happy-veterans-day-my-fellow-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-ovpec and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4900 posts. Post 4929 Vepo Design Corporation and its officers (collectively, “Vepo”) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their breach of contract and bad faith claims against American Economy Insurance Company (“AEIC”). Vepo’s claims relate to AEIC’s denial of coverage following a fire in a laundromat, known as the “Central Laundromat,” which Vepo was developing. In Vepo Design Corporation, et al. v. American Economy Insurance Company, No. 23-55634, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (November 4, 2024) the issues were resolved serially. DECISIONS Business Income The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AEIC on Vepo’s business income claim, which concerns income Vepo contends it would have earned operating the Central Laundromat if the fire had not occurred. AEIC argued that Vepo’s claim for lost income was too speculative given that the Central Laundromat was still under construction and Vepo had not secured additional financing to own and operate it. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Vepo as the non-moving party the Ninth Circuit concluded that there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact and that Vepo’s claim for lost business income is not unduly speculative. There is evidence that Vepo was contemplating an arrangement under which it would own and operate the Central Laundromat for a period of time before selling it, and that Vepo later engaged in similar arrangements for other laundromats. Vepo, which was experienced in the laundromat industry, also demonstrated that it had a history of securing financing for its laundromat projects and that it intended to refinance the Central Laundromat once a certificate of occupancy was received. Although Vepo had not secured refinancing for the Central Laundromat as of the time of the fire, Vepo’s Principal Owner stated in her declaration and confirmed at her deposition that it was too early to do so in the project timeline. That Vepo had yet to refinance does not render its claim too speculative as a matter of law and its losses are for a jury to decide. Extra Expense The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AEIC for the extra expenses that Vepo allegedly incurred in storing laundry equipment in a warehouse owned by Vepo’s sister company following the fire. While the policy only required the expense to be incurred, not paid, there was insufficient evidence to create a triable issue over whether the expense was incurred at all. No payment changed hands between the two entities, and there is no accounting record showing that Vepo was liable for the storage amount. When the same person signed as representative of both entities, does not create a genuine dispute of material fact. Lost Profits The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Vepo’s claim for lost profits on the prospective sale of the laundromat. Even assuming that such a loss would be covered under the policy, the claim fails because the policy limited coverage to losses that occur within one year of the incident. Vepo’s plan called for it to own and operate the Central Laundromat for at least one year after opening, which would place any hypothetical sale more than a year after the pre-opening fire. Individual Personal Property Claims The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for AEIC on the claims by the individual plaintiffs for their own personal property that was allegedly lost in the fire. As the district court correctly found, Vepo did not identify what individual property was lost or its worth. The individual plaintiffs’ claims were too unsupported to create a triable issue. Bad Faith The Ninth Circuit partially reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Vepo’s bad faith claim, to the extent of the single insurance claim it allowed to go forward-the business income claim. The district court may permit any further motions practice on the bad faith claim as it deems appropriate. However, it affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the bad faith claim insofar as that claim is premised on any of the other breach of contract claims to which AEIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is never a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing if there was no improper denial of coverage under the policy. ZALMA OPINION The importance of this case is the reiteration of the law that there can never be a viable tort of bad faith if there is no improper denial of a claim by breach of the insurance contract. If the one cause of action remaining was breached in bad faith and there was no genuine dispute over coverage, that cause can be brought for bad faith damages. The other decisions of the Ninth Circuit were obvious and well reasoned. (c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos. Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe Go to X @bzalma; Go to Newsbreak.com https://www.newsbreak.com/@c/1653419?s=01; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk

Leviticus Chapter 24 1 And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying, 2 Command the children of Israel, that they bring unto thee pure oil olive beaten for the light, to cause the lamps to burn continually. 3 Without the vail of the testimony, in the tabernacle of the congregation, shall Aaron order it from the evening unto the morning before the LORD continually: it shall be a statute for ever in your generations. 4 He shall order the lamps upon the pure candlestick before the LORD continually. 5 And thou shalt take fine flour, and bake twelve cakes thereof: two tenth deals shall be in one cake. 6 And thou shalt set them in two rows, six on a row, upon the pure table before the LORD. 7 And thou shalt put pure frankincense upon each row, that it may be on the bread for a memorial, even an offering made by fire unto the LORD. 8 Every sabbath he shall set it in order before the LORD continually, being taken from the children of Israel by an everlasting covenant. 9 And it shall be Aaron's and his sons'; and they shall eat it in the holy place: for it is most holy unto him of the offerings of the LORD made by fire by a perpetual statute. 10 And the son of an Israelitish woman, whose father was an Egyptian, went out among the children of Israel: and this son of the Israelitish woman and a man of Israel strove together in the camp; 11 And the Israelitish woman's son blasphemed the name of the LORD, and cursed. And they brought him unto Moses: (and his mother's name was Shelomith, the daughter of Dibri, of the tribe of Dan:) 12 And they put him in ward, that the mind of the LORD might be shewed them. 13 And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying, 14 Bring forth him that hath cursed without the camp; and let all that heard him lay their hands upon his head, and let all the congregation stone him. 15 And thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, saying, Whosoever curseth his God shall bear his sin. 16 And he that blasphemeth the name of the LORD, he shall surely be put to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the stranger, as he that is born in the land, when he blasphemeth the name of the LORD, shall be put to death. 17 And he that killeth any man shall surely be put to death. 18 And he that killeth a beast shall make it good; beast for beast. 19 And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbour; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him; 20 Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again. 21 And he that killeth a beast, he shall restore it: and he that killeth a man, he shall be put to death. 22 Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: for I am the LORD your God. 23 And Moses spake to the children of Israel, that they should bring forth him that had cursed out of the camp, and stone him with stones. And the children of Israel did as the LORD commanded Moses.